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Lawrence J. Fossi, * Cynthia A. Stephens,
Bryant W. Burke, *** and Philip D. Weller****
T- HE Texas Supreme Court's 1989 decision in Summers v. Consoli-
dated Capital Special Trust I is a marvelous specimen of a creature
thought to have become extinct: a high court opinion whose method
is to honor rather than dismiss the intention of contracting adults. Although
this unicorn must for the while mingle with the grotesque and ponderous
beasts that in recent years have trampled underfoot vast prairies of the com-
mon law, one hopes that in the coming decade the lone creature will attract
equally noble company, so that the menagerie of miscreants begotten in the
1980's may be supplanted by legal animals that are easier to recognize and
slower to mutate.
Besides Summers, there were other reasons why 1989 was momentous.
The war over mortgage foreclosures, whose hostages include the private sale
remedy, saw some crucial battles which promise to set the tone of campaigns
to follow. 2 Eviction procedures survived a constitutional siege.3 Another
arrow was added to the quiver of constructive eviction.4 The rights of con-
dominium associations received reinforcement.5 Ramparts were erected
against landlords' withholding consent to lease assignments.6 Title company
defenses suffered yet another incursion from liability in negligence.7 And in
virtually all areas of real estate law, the statutory lines were shored up with
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legislative amendments and additions, including the adoption of two new




In Summers v. Consolidated Capital Special Trust9 the Texas Supreme
Court settled the issue of how to calculate the deficiency or surplus after
foreclosure of a wraparound mortgage. The court held that, absent an ex-
press agreement to the contrary, the law will imply a covenant requiring the
trustee first to apply sales proceeds toward the pre-existing (that is,
"wrapped") debt before making any distribution to the mortgagor. 10 In
Summers, a fifth lien wraparound mortgagee had foreclosed and applied a
portion of its successful bid price against the fourth lien wraparound mort-
gage note, which was then due. The maker of the fifth lien note sued for
excess proceeds, arguing that the court should have credited it with the
amount paid to the fourth lienholder. The appeals court had reversed a trial
court judgment for the foreclosing lender,' 1 and had instead held that the
maker of the fifth lien note was entitled to the amount by which the foreclo-
sure purchase price exceeded the outstanding balance of the fifth lien note.12
The Texas Supreme Court rejected the approach adopted by the appeals
court, 13 finding that such an approach would enable a debtor to obtain a
windfall profit, escape any deficiency obligation, and still leave its lender sad-
dled with a mortgage debt. 14 The high court found that the appeals court
had confused the debtor's obligation to pay the wrapped notes with its obli-
gation to pay the property's contract purchase price.15 According to the
high court, the fact that the debtor had no personal liability on the wrapped
notes did not diminish its obligation to the holder of the wraparound note
for the entire balance of that note.16
In announcing that Texas law would hereafter imply a covenant requiring
the trustee to apply proceeds to the satisfaction of wrapped debt before mak-
ing any distribution to the mortgagor, 17 the court noted that Texas law per-
8. Tax. PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 14.001-14.007 (Vernon Supp. 1990) (adopting the Uni-
form Federal Lien Registration Act); TEx. PROP. CODE ANN. § 5.007 (Vernon Supp. 1990)
(adopting the Vendor and Purchaser Risk Act).
9. 32 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 473 (June 21, 1989).
10. Id. at 475.
11. Id. at 474.
12. Id. at 473. See Consol. Capital Special Trust v. Summers, 737 S.W.2d 327 (Tex.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1987) rev'd, Summers v. Consol. Capital Special Trust, 32 Tex.
Sup. Ct. J. 473 (June 21, 1989); Fossi & Weller, Real Property, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 43
SW.L.J. 257, 298-99 (1989) (discussing ConsoL Capital, 737 S.W.2d at 327) [hereinafter Fossi
& Weller, 1989 Annual Survey].
13. 32 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 474-75.
14. Id. at 474.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 475.
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mitted the insertion of such implied covenants into contracts if necessary to
give effect to the actual intentions of the parties.18 The court noted also that
it was adopting the identical approach taken by other courts that had con-
sidered the question. 19
Three dissenters claimed that the majority had done violence to the par-
ties' intention because the deed of trust did not expressly authorize the
trustee to apply the foreclosure proceeds to senior lien debt.20 Had the dis-
senters simply argued that the lender, having inartfully drafted its loan docu-
ments, must now live with the consequences of a constricted reading, the
dissenting opinion might have some of the persuasiveness of the appeals
court opinion. However, the dissenters' contention that the lender intended
that it would be placed in the position of having to remit some of the lender's
own foreclosure bid to the borrower and yet remain burdened with a huge
mortgage debt seems, quite simply, untenable.
The holding in Summers determined the outcome in Lee v. Key West Tow-
ers, Inc.21 In Lee the holders of two wraparound notes had brought suit
against the makers of those notes after a default by the property owner trig-
gered a series of other defaults under the wrapped notes and resulted in fore-
closure. The trial court had held, and the appeals court had agreed, that to
calculate the deficiency, one shall subtract the unpaid balances of the
wrapped notes from the outstanding balance of the wrap note.22 By reason
of the implied covenant recognized in Summers, the Texas Supreme Court
reversed the judgment of the appeals court23 and held that each maker was
liable to its lender for the entire amount of the wraparound note less the
amount bid at foreclosure. 24
B. Foreclosures and Deficiency Judgments
A war is underway over the adequacy of foreclosure sales prices. Three
Survey cases, Charter National Bank - Houston v, Stevens,25 Olney Savings
and Loan Association v. Farmers Market of Odessa, Inc.,26 and Savers Fed-
eral Savings & Loan Association v. Reetz,27 contain salvos from both sides of
the battlefield, and promise to furnish some of the ammunition for coming
clashes.
Charter is yet another well-researched and carefully written opinion from
18. Id. (citing Danciger Oil & Ref. Co. v. Powel, 137 Tex. 484, 490, 154 S.W.2d 632, 635
(1941)).
19. Id. (citing J.M. Realty Inv. Corp. v. Stem, 296 So.2d 588 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974);
Armsey v. Channel Assoc., Inc., 184 Cal. App. 3d 833, 229 Cal. Rptr. 509 (1986)).
20. Id. at 476 (Mauzy, J., dissenting).
21. 32 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 477 (June 21, 1989).
22. Id. at 478.
23. Id. at 474.
24. Id. at 478
25. Charter Nat'l. Bank-Houston v. Stevens, No. A14-88-00421-CV (Tex. App.-Hous-
ton [14th Dist.] Oct. 26, 1989, n.w.h.) (not yet reported).
26. Olney Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Farmers Mkt. of Odessa, Inc., 764 S.W.2d 869 (Tex.
App.-El Paso 1989, writ requested).
27. 888 F.2d 1497 (5th Cir. 1989).
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the Fourteenth Court of Appeals. Charter exhaustively reviews Texas
wrongful foreclosure law and makes new law by holding that under some
circumstances a mortgagor need not prove that the foreclosure sales price
was grossly inadequate to prevail in a wrongful foreclosure action.28 For
those reasons, the case will likely become a seminal starting point in the
analysis of many wrongful foreclosure claims.
In Charter the tenant in a Houston commercial building that was posted
for foreclosure began phoning the lender about a week before the foreclosure
date to express an interest in bidding on the property. Because the lender
had, since first posting the property, thrice passed the foreclosure sale, the
tenant asked whether the sale would indeed transpire on the following Tues-
day. Each time the bank responded that it was uncertain whether the sale
would take place, but promised that it would notify the tenant if the sale
were to go forward. The tenant's final such inquiry took place at 5 p.m. on
the Monday before the sale; the tenant's Dallas attorney, who had arranged
$400,000 of interim financing to enable the tenant to bid, was in Houston
and was prepared to stay over for the next day's sale. At the time of the call,
however, the lender's representative had reportedly left work for the day.
Although the lender failed to notify the tenant, the sale took place on the
following day. The lender, the sale's only bidder, acquired the property for
$355,000 and shortly thereafter acquired casualty insurance coverage of
$425,000. The tenant again offered to buy the property, this time at the
lender's purchase price. The lender refused, offering instead to sell for
$420,000. Some months later, the lender sold the property for $385,000; the
purchaser took subject to a lis pendens filed in the interim by the tenant.
Later, the mortgagor intervened in the tenant's suit, alleging wrongful fore-
closure and seeking damages. The trial court awarded nothing to the ten-
ant29 because of the jury's finding that the lender's promises to the tenant
were not made with the intent that the tenant would rely on them.30 The
trial court rendered judgment for the mortgagor,3' however, and awarded
actual damages based on the difference between the outstanding indebted-
ness of approximately $375,000 and the property's $430,000 fair market
value as determined by the jury.32
On appeal, the lender argued that the trial court erred in not instructing
the jury that in order to sustain the mortgagor's claim, it had to find that the
foreclosure sales price was grossly inadequate.33 The appeals court meticu-
lously worked its way back through more than a century of wrongful fore-
28. No. A14-88-00421-CV at 14.




33. Id. at 6. The lender urged that, by reason of American Savings and Loan Association
of Houston v. Musick, 531 S.W.2d 581 (Tex. 1975), three elements must be found to sustain a
wrongful foreclosure claim: (1) a defect in the foreclosure proceedings, (2) a grossly inadequate




closure law.34 The court concluded that the law never intended the grossly
inadequate sales price requirement to apply in a situation where (1) the bid-
ding at a non-judicial foreclosure sale is deliberately chilled by the affirma-
tive acts of a mortgagee and (2) the injured mortgagor elects recovery of
damages rather than a setting aside of the sale.3"
The appeals court in Charter agreed that the stricter traditional test,
which requires showing that a procedural defect caused a grossly inadequate
sales price, is appropriate in actions to set aside foreclosure sales.36 Other-
wise, it noted, the risk of rescission would drive down the bid prices.37 The
court stated, however, that a defaulting mortgagor has a right to an orderly
disposition of his pledged property,38 and added, in a somewhat hyperbolic
flourish, that sound policy reasons favor the deterrence of acts "calculated to
injure a helpless mortgagor and unjustly enrich a machiavellian
mortgagee."'39
Olney arose out of a 1983 real estate loan transaction wherein the lender
relied on a title company to prepare loan documents, including a guaranty of
the corporate borrower's debt by the borrower's shareholders. The title
company botched the job, indicating in the written guaranties that the cor-
poration was guaranteeing the shareholders' debts rather than vice versa.
When the borrower defaulted in 1987, the lender foreclosed, buying the
property at foreclosure for $150,000 and then selling the same property for
$200,000 eight days later. At the time of the foreclosure, the lender discov-
ered the mistaken guaranties, altered them to reflect that the shareholders
were the guarantors of the borrower's debt, and sued the guarantors for the
deficiency basing its deficiency calculation on the $150,000 foreclosure price.
The guarantors claimed that the lender had wrongfully altered the guar-
anties, damaged their credit and reputation, and caused them anguish. The
jury agreed and awarded each of them damages. 40 The appeals court re-
versed and remanded,41 holding that the trial court erred in not submitting
to the jury the lender's claim that the original guaranties resulted from a
clear mistake and should be reformed. 42 The appeals court noted that if the
lender prevailed on its reformation claim, then the guarantors' action for
34. Id. at 6-13 (discussing University Say. Assoc. v. Springwoods Shopping Center, 644
S.W.2d 705 (Tex. 1982); American Say. & Loan Assoc. of Houston v. Musick, 531 S.W.2d 581
(Tex. 1975); Tarrant Say. Ass'n v. Lucky Homes, Inc., 390 S.W.2d 473 (Tex. 1965); Slaughter
v. Qualls, 139 Tex. 340, 162 S.W.2d 671 (1942); McKennon v. McGown, 11 S.W. 532 (1889);
Allen v. Pierson, 60 Tex. 604 (1884); Sparkman v. McWhirter, 263 S.W.2d 832 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Dallas 1953, writ ref'd).
35. No. A14-88-00421-CV at 13-14.
36. The mortgagor must elect either to seek to set the sale aside or to seek recovery of
damages. Id. at 14; see Owens v. Grimes, 539 S.W.2d 387, 390 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1976,
writ ref'd n.r.e.).
37. No. A14-88.00421-CV at 12 (citing Allen v. Pierson, 60 Tex. 604, 607 (1884)).
38. Id. at 13 (citing G.S. NELSON, REAL EsrATE FrNANCE LAw 558 (2d ed. 1985)). In
recognizing such a right, the appeals court cited no Texas authority.
39. Id. at 14.
40. 764 S.W.2d at 870.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 871-72.
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damages would be dealt a fatal blow. 4 3
The crucial disputed issue was whether the law required the lender to
prove that its bid price at foreclosure was fair and reasonable. The appeals
court's opinion noted that the lender's pleadings stipulated that the foreclo-
sure sales price was fair and reasonable, and thereby the lender assumed the
burden of proving that fact.44 Moreover, the court stated that the evidence
about the property's value, which included an appraisal prepared for the
lender shortly before the foreclosure sale, was relevant to the issues of the
lender's alleged bad faith, fraud, and intentional infliction of mental anguish
on the guarantors.45 The cases cited by the majority to support its position,
Lee v. Sabine Bank 46 and Heller and Company v. 0/S Sonny V.,4 7 did not
involve foreclosures on real property, but rather non-judicial sales of person-
alty to which courts have customarily applied a fair and reasonable
standard.48
A concurring opinion took issue with the majority's view of the valuation
evidence. 49 It noted that the borrower never attacked the validity of the
foreclosure sale, and stated that absent such an attack, a court should pre-
sume that the price paid at foreclosure was fair and reasonable.50 "Neither
the lender nor the debtor should be required or permitted to wait until the
property is sold by the lender, whether it be one week or one year later to
determine if a deficiency exists or whether the debtor may be entitled to a
credit." 51 The concurring judge also doubted whether, absent some showing
of an irregularity, a court could ever set aside a foreclosure sale for inade-
quacy of consideration.5 2
In Savers Federal the guarantors of a mortgage note asserted that the
bank's foreclosure bids on two properties were inadequate, and that there-
fore no deficiency existed under the note. The Fifth Circuit first disposed of
the guarantors' claim that procedural irregularities had tainted the foreclo-
sure sale by holding that the claim was never raised until after the trial
court's judgment in favor of the bank.53 The court then confronted the cru-
cial issue of whether the inadequacy of consideration at a regularly con-
ducted nonjudicial foreclosure sale makes the foreclosure invalid. It
determined that under long-established Texas law, a foreclosure is invalid
only if there exist both a procedural irregularity and a grossly inadequate
sales price, and observed that this rule applies equally whether the lienholder
43. Id. at 872.
44. Id. at 871.
45. Id.
46. 708 S.W.2d 582 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
47. 595 F.2d 968 (5th Cir. 1979).
48. 708 S.W.2d at 585.
49. 764 S.W.2d at 873 (Osborn, C.J., concurring).
50. Id.
51. Id. at 873.
52. Id. (citing American Say. & Loan Ass'n of Houston v. Musick, 531 S.W.2d 581 (Tex.
1975)).
53. 888 F.2d at 1500.
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or a third party is the purchaser at foreclosure. 54
The circuit judges distinguished Lee v. Sabine Bank 55 as a personal prop-
erty case, and noted that the Fifth Circuit decisions relied on by the Lee
court arose out of federal statutory law concerning deficiency judgments on
ship mortgages. 56 The judges concluded that Lee says "absolutely nothing"
about Texas law respecting deficiency judgments following real estate fore-
closures.57 The court labelled as "purest dicta" the suggestion in Lee that
the Lee holding need not be restricted to ships, and said that the dicta was
all the more unpersuasive for failing to cite a single pertinent Texas case.
The circuit judges were similarly unimpressed with Lee's immediate prog-
eny, Halter v. Allied Merchants Bank.58 They pointed out that the language
in Halter suggesting that a regularly conducted foreclosure might be invalid
if the lienholder or its surrogate was the purchaser was also mere dicta since
there was no evidence in Halter that the lienholder was the purchaser.
Moreover, the only authority cited by the Beaumont appeals court in Halter
was that court's holding in Lee.
The Fifth Circuit similarly took aim at Olney Savings & Loan Association
v. Farmers Market of Odessa, Inc.,59 discussed earlier. The circuit judges
found that the majority opinion in Olney was undergirded only with ship
mortgage cases and the unsupported dicta from Lee and Halter, and that it
failed to grapple with well-established Texas Supreme Court cases to the
contrary.6° The circuit judges fortified their conclusion by reviewing the
statutory scheme that for the past century has governed nonjudicial foreclo-
sure sales. They pointed out that since the controlling Texas Supreme Court
cases were handed down, the Texas legislature has thrice amended the statu-
tory scheme in ways designed t6 enhance the fairness of foreclosure sales. 61
This circumstance justifies the conclusion that the legislature viewed the
controlling Texas Supreme Court cases as appropriate components of a
proper scheme for regulating real estate nonjudicial foreclosures. 62
At the time Savers Federal was argued, Charter had not been decided. It
seems likely, though, that the court in Savers Federal would have sought to
confine the Charter holding within that case's idiosyncratic facts. Your au-
thors expect that the debate outlined in Charter, Olney, and Savers Federal
will continue until either the legislature or the Texas Supreme Court again
makes some definitive pronouncement on the subject.
54. Id. at 1503 (citing, e.g., Tarrant Savings Ass'n v. Lucky Homes, Ind., 390 S.W.2d 473,
475 (rex. 1965); American Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Musick, 531 S.W.2d 581, 587 (Tex.
1975)).
55. 708 S.W.2d 582 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
56. 888 S.W.2d at 1503.
57. Id.
58. 751 S.W.2d 286 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1988, writ denied).
59. 764 S.W.2d 869 (rex. App.-El Paso 1989, writ pending application).
60. Id. at 1506.
61. Id. at 1507.
62. Id. (citing Coastal Industrial Water Authority v. Trinity Portland Cement, 563
S.W.2d 916, 918 (Tex. 1978); Kennedy v. Hyde, 682 S.W.2d 525, 529 (Tex. 1984)).
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In Federal Savings & Loan Insurance Corp. v. Kerr63 the FSLIC had as-
serted that its status as receiver for an insolvent savings and loan association
which held a junior lien on certain property meant that the FSLIC's ap-
proval was required before the senior lienholder could foreclose. Much to
the relief of solvent lienholders all over the country, the Fifth Circuit dis-
agreed.64 The FSLIC based its contention on two federal statutes: the first
prohibits a court from taking any action that affects the powers or functions
of a receiver 65 and the second empowers the FSLIC to release claims in
favor of the insolvent thrift for whom the FSLIC is acting as receiver. 66 The
appellate court found both statutes inapplicable; the first because no court
involvement occurs in a non-judicial foreclosure sale67 and the second be-
cause neither the senior lienholder nor the FSLIC had any claim against the
other.68 The Fifth Circuit noted that to hold otherwise would impose a tre-
mendous burden on the senior lienholder by, in effect, forcing that lienholder
to share the FSLIC's risky junior position. 69
One of the stranger foreclosure cases from this Survey, Diversified, Ina v.
Gibraltar Savings Association,70 arose when a lender failed to advise the
trustee that the mortgagors had cured the default on the eve of foreclosure.
Two days after the foreclosure sale the trustee explained the mistake to the
purchaser, who evidently was in the business of buying and selling foreclosed
properties.71 Several weeks thereafter, the law firm for whom the trustee
worked attempted to return the purchaser's cashier's check and requested a
reconveyance to clear title.
The explanations did not mollify the purchaser. It initiated legal proceed-
ings to evict the mortgagors from the property, prompting a suit by the
lender and the mortgagors for cancellation of the trustee's deed. Eventually,
the purchaser conveyed its interest in the property to the mortgagors in ex-
change for any causes of action the mortgagors might have arising out of the
wrongful foreclosure, and sued the lender, the trustee, and the trustee's law
firm for breach of contract, breach of warranty, common law fraud, statu-
tory fraud,7 2 negligence, negligent misrepresentation, wrongful foreclosure,
and Deceptive Trade Practices Act ("DTPA") violations. 73
The appeals court affirmed the trial court's summary judgment against the
purchaser on all claims except those arising under the DTPA.7 4 The court
found that there existed no intent to defraud, no duty of the lender or trustee
63. 859 F.2d 1226 (5th Cir. 1988).
64. Id. at 1227-28.
65. 12 U.S.C. § 1464(d)(6)(C) (1989).
66. 12 U.S.C. § 1729(d) (1989).
67. 859 F.2d at 1228.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. 762 S.W.2d 620 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1988, writ denied).
71. See Diversified, Inc. v. Walker, 702 S.W.2d 717 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]
1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
72. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 27.01 (Vernon 1987).
73. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.46(b)(5), (12), (14), (19), (23) (Vernon 1987)
74. 762 S.W. 2d at 621.
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to the purchaser, and no basis in the law for warranty claims." The appeals
court also affirmed the dismissal of the wrongful foreclosure claim.76 The
court noted that the purchaser was claiming under the mortgagors, who had
already elected the remedy of voiding the sale and, therefore, had no dam-
ages claim.77 The appeals court, however, remanded on the DTPA claims,7 8
noting that most of those claims would not require the purchaser to prove
any knowledge or intent to deceive on the part of the lender, trustee, or law
firm.7 9
This year's Survey of mortgage cases is not without its comic relief, thanks
in large part to Smith v. United States National Bank of Galveston,80 Hunt v.
Jefferson Savings & Loan Association,"1 and Martin v. Uvalde Savings and
Loan Association 8 2 In Smith a lender holding a second lien note had decided
to protect its junior position by acquiring the first lien note and the mortgage
and guaranty that secured that note. The lender subsequently foreclosed on
the second lien, then sued the guarantor after a default on the first lien note.
On appeal, the borrower made the rather ingenious claim that once the
lender owned both the first and second liens, those liens merged, and foreclo-
sure under the second lien therefore had the effect of discharging the first
note and guaranty. The appeals court refused to take the bait; it said that
even had the borrower not waived such a defense by failing to include it in
the pleadings, the borrower's theory would still be defective.83 It is well
established that merger depends largely upon the intent of the party holding
the liens.84 In this case ample evidence existed that the bank had not in-
tended merger, but rather acquired the first lien to protect its second lien. 5
In Hunt a mortgagor whose properties had been foreclosed challenged the
lender's attempt to collect deficiency balances by claiming that the law re-
quired the lender to bid at foreclosure no less than the amounts of casualty
insurance coverage required for the properties by the loan documents. The
appeals court affirmed the trial court's summary judgment.86 The court
noted that the mortgagor had cited no authority to support his novel propo-
sition,87 and agreed with the lender that the levels of insurance coverage
spoke to replacement value rather than market value.88 The appeals court
75. Id. at 622 (relying on Diversified, Inc. v. Walker, 702 S.W.2d 717 (Tex. App.-Hous-
ton [Ist Dist.] 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
76. Id. at 623
77. Id. (citing Owens v. Grimes, 539 S.W.2d 387, 390 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1976, writ
ref'd n.r.e.)).
78. Id.
79. Id. The purchaser's claims under the DTPA were based on TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE
ANN. § 17.46(b)(5), (12), (14), (19), (23) (Vernon 1987).
80. 767 S.W.2d 820 (rex. App.-Texarkana 1989, writ denied).
81. 756 S.W.2d 762 (rex. App.-Dallas 1988, writ denied) cert. denied, 109 S.Ct. 1532,
103 L.Ed.2d 837 (1989).
82. 773 S.W.2d 808 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1989, n.w.h.).
83. 767 S.W.2d at 823.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. 756 S.W.2d at 763.




also rejected the mortgagor's claimed credit against the deficiencies in an
amount equal to private mortgage proceeds received by the lender.89 The
court held that the mortgagor had no contractual right to any such offset,
and the law required none.90
Martin takes this Survey's prize for borrower bravado. In Martin the bor-
rowers, who were in default under their mortgage note and were facing fore-
closure, executed and recorded a warranty deed, purporting therein to
convey the property to the lender in full satisfaction of the mortgage debt.
The lender proceeded with the foreclosure, sued for the deficiency, and was
granted summary judgment.91
On appeal, the borrowers cited extensive authority92 for the proposition
that the execution and delivery of a deed gives rise to a rebuttable presump-
tion that the grantee has accepted the conveyance. 93 The appeals court
agreed, but distinguished the cases cited by the borrowers as instances in
which the deed was delivered to and recorded by the grantee, not the gran-
tor, and noted that in this case no evidence of acceptance of the deed by the
lender existed. 94 Since it is well-settled that a deed is not effective absent
delivery9" and delivery does not occur absent either express or implied ac-
ceptance, 96 the borrowers' purported conveyance was ineffective. 97
First Texas Service Corporation v. McDonald 98 suggests that trustees con-
ducting foreclosure sales might want to bring a good book to read. In First
Texas the party who was the high bidder asked the trustee to give him time
to obtain a $16,000 cashier's check. Evidence existed that the trustee agreed
he would wait 45 minutes, that the high bidder and his broker departed
immediately, that the trustee sold the property to another party only 40 min-
utes later, and that the high bidder returned within the agreed upon 45-
minute interval, check in hand, only minutes after the trustee and the other
party completed the sale.
In affirming the trial court's decision to set aside the sale,99 the appeals
court relied on the Texas Supreme Court's decision in First Federal Savings
89. Id. at 765.
90. Id. Presumably, no right of subrogation would be allowed to the private mortgage
insurer.
91. 773 S.W.2d at 810.
92. Eg., Raymond v. Aquarius Condominium Owners Ass'n, Inc., 662 S.W.2d 82, 91
(Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1983, no writ); Austin v. Bice, 586 S.W.2d 931, 933 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Waco 1979, no writ); Chandler v. Hartt, 467 S.W.2d 629, 633 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler
1971, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
93. 773 S.W.2d at 812.
94. Id.
95. Dikes v. Miller, 24 Tex. 417 (1859).
96. Robert Burns Concrete Contractors, Inc. v. Norman, 561 S.W.2d 614, 618 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Tyler 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
97. 773 S.W.2d at 812-13. A strikingly similar case, with a similar result, is Hennessey v.
Bell, 775 S.W.2d 650 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1988, writ denied) (no presumption of ac-
ceptance of property as satisfaction of debt where borrower executed and recorded deed with-
out approval, acquiescence or knowledge of lender).
98. 762 S.W.2d 935 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1988, writ denied).
99. Id. at 937.
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& Loan Association of Dallas v. Sharp,1°° which stated that a trustee has a
duty to allow a bidder a reasonable time to produce his funds.10 The ap-
peals court held that how much time is reasonable depends on the facts of
each case.10 2 The court observed that in this case the trustee himself indi-
cated that 45 minutes was reasonable by agreeing to wait that long.103 The
appeals court, in a rather unpersuasive passage, rejected the trustee's asser-
tion that any oral agreement to wait 45 minutes would have violated the
statute of frauds.104 The court said that the dispute did not involve a con-
tract to sell land, but rather whether the trustee waited a reasonable period
of time. 105
Several other Survey cases saw courts affirm settled principles of foreclo-
sure law.106 In Shearer v. Allied Live Oak Bank10 7 the appeals court re-
jected the mortgagor's contention that an invalid foreclosure had the effect
of extinguishing the debt and lien. 10 8 The court held instead that because
the foreclosure sale had been declared void for lack of notice to the debtors,
both the debt and the lien were revived and remained outstanding.10 9 In
Newman v. Woodhaven National Bank, Inc 10 the appeals court confirmed
that the 21-day notice period found in Section 51.002(b) of the Texas Prop-
erty Code' includes the day of service, but excludes the day of the foreclo-
sure sale.' 12
In Rosa de Saron Church v. Rodriguez1 3 the church claimed that its good
faith tender of approximately $12,000 prior to foreclosure rendered the fore-
closure sale invalid, even though the outstanding debt (including principal,
interest, and attorneys' fees) was approximately $18,000. In support of its
argument, the church noted that the foreclosure notice did not specify the
amount due and that the noteholder gave no reason for rejecting the tender.
The appeals court affirmed the trial court's rejection of the church's
100. 359 S.W.2d 902 (Tex. 1962).
101. Id. at 903.
102. 762 S.W.2d at 938.
103. Id.
104. TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 26.01(a), (b)(4) (Vernon 1987) (stipulating that
contract for sale of real estate not enforceable unless in writing and signed).
105. 762 S.W.2d at 941. Perhaps a better answer might have been that the statute of frauds
will not be applied to non-judicial foreclosure sales, since such sales must take place within a 3-
hour window once a month. Or perhaps prudent trustees will make a practice of memorial-
izing agreements to wait for funds, thereby allowing the trustees either to proceed with the sale
or to sue the promisor in contract if the agreed time is exceeded.
106. See cases cited infra notes 73, 75, 78.
107. 758 S.W.2d 940 (rex. App.--Corpus Christi 1988, writ denied).
108. Id. at 942-43.
109. Id.
110. 762 S.W.2d 374 (rex. App.-Fort Worth 1988, no writ).
111. TEx. PROP. CODE ANN. § 51.002(b) (Vernon Supp 1990).
112. 762 S.W.2d at 376 (citing Valley v. Patterson, 614 S.W.2d 867, 871 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Corpus Christi 1981, no writ); Hausmann v. Texas Say. & Loan Ass'n, 585 S.W.2d 796, 801(rex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.; TEx. PROP. CODE ANN. § 51.002(b) (Vernon
Supp. 1990) (codified TEx. REv. CIVIL STAT. ANN. art. 310 (repealed 1984) (contained simi-
lar language requiring at least twenty-one days notice preceding the date of sale)).
113. 767 S.W.2d 898 (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi 1989, n.w.h.).
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claims. 114 The court applied the general rule that a property owner seeking
to prevent a foreclosure sale must tender the full amount then due." 5 The
court noted that the amount of the indebtedness was readily ascertainable
from the loan documents, that no law required the noteholder to indicate the
amount due in the foreclosure notice, and that the church had never asked
the noteholder to provide a payoff amount." 6
C. Temporary Injunctions
Southwestern Savings & Loan Association v. Mullaney Construction Com-
pany117 affirmed the well-established but often-ignored principle that the ab-
sence of an adequate remedy of law is essential to obtaining injunctive
relief."18 The trial court in Southwestern Savings had enjoined a foreclosure
based on the developer's contentions that the lender had made oral misrepre-
sentations and that the developer would suffer loss of profits and interrup-
tion of business if the foreclosure went forward."19 In dissolving the
injunction, the appeals court refused to follow Home Savings of America,
F.A. v. Van Cleave Development Company 120 and Guardian Savings and
Loan Association v. Williams,121 wherein San Antonio and Houston courts
of appeals had upheld temporary injunctions enjoining foreclosures under
similar circumstances. 122 The Southwestern Savings court said that the fact
that a motion for a temporary injunction involves real estate is not disposi-
tive of whether an adequate remedy at law exists.' 23 In this case, the court
said, the builder would have adequate remedies at law if he ultimately
proved the foreclosure to be wrongful. 124
The San Antonio Court of Appeals took the opposite approach in Metro-
politan Life Insurance Company v. La Mansion Hotels & Resorts, Ltd. 125 In
that case, the appeals court affirmed the granting of a temporary injunction
to block a foreclosure sale of hotel properties.' 26 The court indicated that
the uniqueness of every piece of real property tends to establish the
114. Id. at 902.
115. Id. (citing American Century Mortgage Investors v. Regional Center, Ltd., 529
S.W.2d 578, 584 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
116. 767 S.W.2d at 901-02. The court did not, however, rule out further appeal by the
church to a Higher Authority.
117. 771 S.W.2d 205 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1989, n.w.h.).
118. Id. at 206.
119. Id.
120. 737 S.W. 2d 58 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1987, no writ).
121. 731 S.W.2d 107 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1987, no writ).
122. In Home Savings a court granted a developer a temporary injunction preventing a
foreclosure based on the court's finding, among other things, that the foreclosure could result
in irreparable damage to the developer's credit rating and damage the development of which
the property to be foreclosed upon was a part. 737 S.W.2d at 59. Similarly, in Guardian
Savings a court enjoined a lender from foreclosing based on testimony from the developer that
the foreclosure would ruin its reputation, prevent him from borrowing at other financial insti-
tutions, and significantly impair his business as a developer. 731 S.W.2d at 108-09.
123. 771 S.W.2d at 207.
124. Id.
125. 762 S.W.2d 646 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1988, writ dism'd as moot).
126. Id. at 652.
[Vol. 44
REAL PROPERTY
probability of irreparable injury. 127 The court additionally found ample evi-
dence of the inequitable conduct by the lender.128 This included the lender's
conspiracy with a hotel company (which was wholly owned by the lender
during most relevant times) regarding arrangements for owning and manag-
ing the distressed properties following foreclosure and the lender's rejection
of the borrower's proposal to bring in an additional investor who would con-
tribute enough cash to bring the note current. 129
The appeals court's opinion in Metropolitan certainly paints a lurid pic-
ture of a scheming and duplicitous lender. But reading between the lines,
one comes away with an unsettled feeling about the case's outcome. The
borrower had been experiencing financial difficulties for more than a year
and was three months in arrears on its note before the lender began discus-
sions with the third party hotel company. The court does not explain what
is so conniving about a lender making contingency arrangements to manage
large properties whose mortgages are in default, nor does it explain what is
so unnatural about a lender making those arrangements with a management
company that it owns. As for the white knight investor that the lender pur-
portedly shunned, the opinion indicates that the borrower and lender actu-
ally spent more than a year discussing the investment proposal. 130
Moreover, the court makes new law in Texas by holding that a parent and
its wholly owned subsidiary can be parties to a common law civil conspir-
acy.131 The court, however, suggests no common sense reason why this
should be so. Finally, although the court twice insists that the borrower has
a large equity in the property, 132 the borrower's inability to meet debt service
(at the time the court granted the injunction, the past due interest amounted
to $1,300,000133) seems to belie the court's view.
D. Lien Priorities
The next time someone claims that government intervention is needed to
assure a uniform and rational approach to a difficult problem, refer him to
Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. v. RepublicBank Lubbock, NA. 134 In that
case, the FDIC, acting on behalf of the insolvent Texas Bank and Trust
Company, contended that Texas Bank's mortgage on a particular building
should prime RepublicBank's mortgage on the identical building because the
county clerk stamped the Texas Bank mortgage one minute earlier. The
FDIC made that argument despite express language in the Texas Bank
mortgage reciting that it was subordinate and despite a recorded subordina-
127. Id. (citing Home Sav. of Am., F.A. v. Van Cleave Dev. Co., 737 S.W.2d 58, 59 (rex.
App.-San Antonio 1987, no writ)).
128. Id. at 652-53.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 649-50.
131. Id. at 651-52.
132. Id. at 649, 652.
133. Id. at 653. Despite that amount, the appeals court held that a borrower's bond of only
$400,000 was sufficient. Id.
134. 883 F.2d 427 (5th Cir. 1989).
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tion agreement executed by Texas Bank in favor of RepublicBank. The
FDIC based its claim on a federal statute prohibiting agreements that tend
to diminish the FDIC's interest in any asset and that are not recorded in the
official bank records. 135
The Fifth Circuit quickly disposed of the patently inane argument by not-
ing that the FDIC had no interest for the other party to defeat since the only
interest of Texas Bank was as a junior lienholder. 136 The court also noted
that the first and second mortgages and the subordination agreement, all
recorded documents, were part and parcel of the same transaction 137 and not
likely to mislead banking authorities - the evil that the federal statute was
designed to attack. 138 The court did not chide the FDIC for wasting time
and money, although it might easily have done so in view of the frivolity of
the FDIC's argument and in view of the fact that even while the case was
pending, RepublicBank became the indirect beneficiary of a massive federal
bailout. One hopes the taxpayers enjoyed the spectacle of the Federal dog
chasing its own tail.
City of Amarillo v. Ray Berney Enterprises, Inc. 139 considered whether
foreclosure under a 1977 mortgage extinguished Amarillo hotel occupancy
tax liens which the city imposed after the mortgage lien attached. The trial
court had granted the mortgagee's motion for summary judgment on the
ground that the provision in the 1981 tax ordinance' 40 stating that the occu-
pancy tax is a prior and superior lien on all hotel property violates the Texas
Constitution's prohibition on laws which are retroactive or which impair the
obligation of contracts. 141 The appeals court reversed, 142 holding that the
tax ordinance was not a retroactive law because Amarillo's general power to
levy the tax existed before the mortgage was executed143 and had not im-
paired the mortgagee's contractual right to enforce the mortgage lien be-
135. Id. at 429 n.1; 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e) (1989).
136. 883 F.2d at 429.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. 764 S.W. 2d 861 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1989, no writ).
140. On December 8, 1981 Amarillo passed an ordinance, then designated as Sections 22-
21 through 22-27 of its municipal code, imposing a seven percent (7%) tax on the considera-
tion paid by an occupant of any room or space furnished by a hotel. Id. at 862, Section 22-26
empowered the city tax assessor-collector to make assessments for any delinquent taxes which
would be a prior and superior lien on all hotel property. Id. The authorization for the ordi-
nance was Article 1259j-4.1, Texas Revised Civil Statutes Annotated, which has since been
repealed and reenacted as §§ 351.002(a), 351.003(a), and 351.004 of the Texas Tax Code. Id.;
TEX. TAX CODE ANN. §§ 351.002(a), .003(a), .004 (Vernon Supp. 1990) (reenacted Act of
June 19, 1983, ch. 944, § 1, 1983 Tex. Gen. Laws 5195, 5195, repealed by Act of May 27, 1987,
ch. 191, § 12, 1987 Tex. Gen. Laws 1410, 1466).
141. TEx. CONST. art. I, § 16.
142. 764 S.W.2d at 861.
143. Id. at 864. The court cited State v. Wynne, 134 Tex. 455, 463-64, 133 S.W. 2d 951,
956 (1939), appeal dismissed, 310 U.S. 610 (1940), reh'g denied, 310 U.S. 659 (1940) and State
v. Bank of Mineral Wells, 251 S.W. 1107, 1113 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1923, writ ref'd) for
the general rule that any private contractual rights are subject to the constitutionally granted




cause the mortgagee remained free to - and did - foreclose its lien. 144
E. Recent Legislation
The 71st legislature amended Article.21.48A of the Texas Insurance Code
to permit a lender to cancel a policy of insurance on foreclosed property and
retain any unearned premium, whose amount must be credited to any defi-
ciency owed by the borrower.145
II. LANDLORD AND TENANT
A. Warranty of Suitability and Constructive Eviction
Contrary to our prognostications in last year's Survey, the warranty of
suitability invented by the Texas Supreme Court in Davidow v. Inwood North
Professional Group-Phase 1 14 6 does not appear to have supplanted the
cause of action for breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment. Rather,
courts have thus far given the new warranty a narrow reading.147 One Texas
appellate court held that the warranty applies only to latent physical or
structural defects148 and thus could not sustain a claim that the landlord had
furnished inadequate parking for the tenant's restaurant operations. 149 In
addition, a Fifth Circuit case held that the tenant's agreement to be responsi-
ble for certain repairs made the warranty inapplicable to any defects later
necessitating such repairs.150
Meanwhile, the cause of action for breach of the covenant of quiet enjoy-
ment, which allows a tenant who proves constructive eviction to terminate
its lease, hardly seems ready to wither and dwindle. In fact, Fidelity Mutual
Life Insurance Company v. Kaminsky 151 gave a fresh injection of vitality to
the constructive eviction doctrine. This case involved a doctor's claim that
his landlord's failure to deal forcefully with anti-abortion protestors
amounted to a constructive eviction. The protestors gathered at the prem-
144. Id. The court quoted the holding in Langever v. Miller, 124 Tex. 80, 94, 76 S.W. 2d
1025, 1032-33 (1934) (quoting Dallas County Levee Improvement DisL No. 6 v. Rugel, 36 S.W.
2d 188, 189 (Tx. Comm'n App. 1931)) for what is meant by the obligation of contracts in the
constitutional prohibition in Article I, § 16 against impairing the obligation of contracts: "[b]y
the obligation of a contract is meant the means, which at the time of its creation the law
afforded for its enforcement." Id.
145. TEx. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.48A, § 3A (Vernon Supp.).
146. 747 S.W.2d 373 (Tex. 1988).
147. Coleman v. Rotana, Inc., 778 S.W.2d 867 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1989, n.w.h.);
148. Id. at 871.
149. Id. at 870-71. The Coleman court also held that the facility alleged to be defective
must be within the leased premises, and hence could not include a parking area to which the
tenant had only non-exclusive rights. Id. The court left open the possibility that the implied
warranty of suitability could include a warranty of adequate parking facilities where the lease
did not address parking. Id. It is unclear from the opinion whether the implied warranty of
suitability would cover only physical or structural defects in the parking facility, or would also
include an obligation on the landlord's part to supply an adequate amount of parking.
150. Chapman & Cole v. Itel Container Int'l B.V., 865 F.2d 676, 681-82 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 110 S.Ct. 201, 107 L.Ed.2d 155 (1989). See infra notes 136-141 and accompanying
text.
151. 768 S.W.2d 818 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1989, n.w.h.).
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ises chiefly on Saturdays to sing and chant in the building's parking lot,
lobby, and atrium. They distributed literature to patients, attempted to dis-
courage the patients from entering the building, and accused the tenant of
killing babies. On occasion, the protestors occupied the building's stairs and
blocked the door to the doctor's offices.
Although the lease required the landlord to provide security guards, none
were present. The landlord's only response to the protestors was to print
notices advising that trespassers failing to leave upon request risked criminal
prosecution. The landlord never distributed those notices, however, and the
Harris County deputy sheriffs summoned by the tenant refused to ask the
protestors to leave absent a directive from the landlord. After enduring six
months of protests, the tenant abandoned the premises. In response to the
landlord's claim for future rentals, the jury found that the landlord had con-
structively evicted the tenant.152
The four elements of a constructive eviction in Texas have traditionally
been (1) the landlord's intention that the tenant no longer use and enjoy the
premises, (2) a material act by the landlord which substantially interferes
with the tenant's use of the premises, (3) a permanent deprivation of such
use which results from such act or omission, and (4) abandonment by the
tenant within a reasonable time thereafter. 15 3 The case law makes clear that
these elements contain some ingredient of fiction. 154 In fact, the first ele-
ment is virtually a complete fiction. The landlord never actually intends that
the tenant should no longer use the premises; rather, the landlord's intent is
said to be inferable from all the circumstances.' 55 Likewise, the requirement
that the deprivation be material and permanent has a great deal of slack in
its joints; courts have held that trash bins and delivery trucks which obstruct
the entrance to a tenant's premises amount to a material and permanent
deprivation, 156 as has failure to repair a heating and air conditioning sys-
tem. 157 Indeed, in Fidelity Mutual, the landlord contended that the tenant
failed to show a material or permanent deprivation since no patient was ever
harmed and the doctor failed to show that he ever lost patients because of
the protests. The appeals court responded by admitting that whether any
material and permanent deprivation has occurred is sometimes a question of
degree. 15 8
Fidelity Mutual is remarkable because in that case the landlord committed
152. Id. at 820.
153. Id. at 819; see, e.g., Downtown Realty, Inc. v. 509 Tremont Bldg., Inc., 748 S.W.2d
309, 311 (rex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1988, n.w.h.); Metroplex Glass Center, Inc. v.
Vantage Properties, Inc., 646 $.W.2d 263, 265 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.)
Steinberg v. Medical Equip. Rental Servs., Inc., 505 S.W.2d 692, 696-97 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Dallas 1974, no writ).
154. See cases cited infra notes 113-22.
155. See, Downtown Realty, Inc. v. 509 Tremont Bldg., Inc., 748 S.W.2d 309, 311 (Tex.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1988, n.w.h.) (citing Metroplex Glass, 646 S.W.2d at 265).
156. Steinberg v. Medical Equip. Rental Servs., Inc., 505 S.W.2d 692, 697 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Dallas 1974, no writ).
157. 748 S.W.2d at 312.
158. 768 S.W.2d at 823.
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no act; rather, the tenant's deprivation resulted from the deeds of third par-
ties who were acting without the landlord's authority or permission. Case
law is well-settled supporting the proposition that a tenant cannot complain
that the landlord has breached a covenant of quiet enjoyment under such
circumstances.159 The appeals court said that, notwithstanding the tradi-
tional formulation of the elements of constructive eviction, case law indicates
that the landlord's omissions, as well as his acts, can form the basis of a
constructive eviction.160 Ample evidence existed that the landlord failed to
take any meaningful step to expel the anti-abortion protestors from the
premises. 161 In the court's view, this omission by the landlord amounted to
permitting the protestors to remain.1 62 The court emphasized that the
protestors' lawyer had advised them to remain in the building unless the
landlord instructed them to leave, and that the sheriff was unable to act
without such an instruction, but that the landlord had never given any such
instruction. 163
Notwithstanding the court's finely drawn distinctions, Fidelity Mutual
represents an overruling of prior case law. The result is not necessarily un-
wise or undesirable, especially because alleviating the interference caused by
the protestors appeared to be beyond the tenant's power but well within that
of the landlord. 164 The traditional formulation of constructive eviction,
however, particularly after Fidelity Mutual, bears so little relationship to the
case law, and would appear to be so confusing to a jury, that perhaps a
restatement is in order. Your authors humbly offer the following definition
for discussion, and suggest that it better describes the elements of construc-
tive eviction than the existing formulation: constructive eviction consists in
(1) a substantial interference with the tenant's use of the premises which is
either caused by the landlord or within the landlord's reasonable power to
alleviate, (2) the absence of any lease provision indicating that the tenant has
assumed the risk of such an interference, (3) the landlord's failure substan-
tially to alleviate such interference within a reasonable period after receiving
notice thereof from the tenant, and (4) the tenant's abandonment of the
premises within a reasonable time after the landlord's failure.
In another constructive eviction decision, Coleman v. Rotana,165 the ten-
ant claimed constructive eviction by reason of the landlord's alleged failure
159. See Angelo v. Deutser, 30 S.W.2d 707, 710 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1930, no
writ); Thomas v. Brin, 38 Tex. Civ. App. 180, 186, 85 S.W. 842, 845 (1905, no writ); Sedberry
v. Verplanck, 31 S.W. 242, 242 (1895, no writ).
160. 768 S.W.2d at 823 (citing Steinberg v. Medical Equip. Rental Servs., Inc., 505 S.W.2d
at 697 (landlord's failure to cause third parties to stop placing trash bins and parking trucks
near entrance to premises held tantamount to act by landlord)).
161. Id. at 822.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 821.
164. Id. But see Right to Life Advocates, Inc. v. Aaron Women's Clinic, 737 S.W.2d 564
(Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1987, writ denied) cert. denied, 109 S.Ct. 71, 102 L.Ed.2d
47 (1988) (tenant had right to seek injunctive relief against anti-abortion protestors who were
picketing in building's parking lot and on its sidewalks though the parking lot and sidewalk
were not part of leased premises).
165. Coleman v. Rotana, Inc., 778 S.W.2d 867 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1989, n.w.h.).
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to provide adequate parking. The tenant appealed the trial court's refusal to
submit the issue to the jury. 16 6 The appeals court concluded that the tenant
had presented some evidence on each of the first three elements of construc-
tive eviction.167 It noted, however, that while the tenant had experienced
parking shortages from the day it opened its doors, the tenant did not aban-
don the premises until 20 months later.' 68 The court held that, as a matter
of law, a 20-month delay is too long to sustain a constructive eviction
claim.169
B. Construction and Interpretation
Case law well establishes the principle that a landlord may withhold its
consent to a tenant's requested assignment or sublease.'170 That principle has
survived numerous assaults, including a recent attempt to impose a standard
of reasonableness,' 7 ' and is enshrined in section 91.005 of the Texas Prop-
erty Code.17 2 Much less certain has been the question of what circumstances
justify a landlord's refusal to consent when the landlord has agreed to act
reasonably. The first definitive answer came in B.M.B. Corporation v. Mc-
Mahan's Valley Stores.' 3 Tenants are likely to applaud the result.
B.M.B. involved a furniture store lease that required the tenant to pay
both fixed rent and percentage rent based on the tenant's sales proceeds
above a threshold level. The lease prohibited any assignment or subletting
without the landlord's consent, which the landlord was not to unreasonably
withhold. The landlord consented to one assignment in 1965, another in
1984, and a third in 1985. Soon after the third assignment, sales dropped
below the percentage rent threshold. The landlord sued for fraud in the
inducement, claiming that during the course of negotiations leading to the
landlord's consent to the 1985 assignment the assignee had made oral guar-
antees concerning the sales volume. The landlord also claimed that the ten-
ant had breached an implied lease covenant to sell only quality furniture and
to maximize percentage rental.
After the jury found in favor of the landlord and awarded damages,1 74 the
166. Id. at 868-69.
167. Id. at 872.
168. Id. The court also said no evidence existed that the parking problem prompted the
abandonment. Id. It noted that, during the 20-month interval, the tenant had changed its
restaurant from a first class restaurant to a Mexican food restaurant, and that the abandon-
ment of the premises followed hard on the heels of a breakdown in negotiations between the
landlord and tenant regarding assignment of the lease. Id.
169. Id. Compare Downtown Realty, Inc. v. 509 Tremont Bldg., Inc., 748 S.W.2d 309, 311
(Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1988, n.w.h.) (ten months not too long); Richker v. Geor-
gandis, 323 S.W.2d 90, 96-97 (rex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1959, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (ten
months not too long).
170. See infra note 128 and accompanying text.
171. Reynolds v. McCullough, 739 S.W.2d 424, 429 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1987, writ
denied).
172. TEx. PROP. CODE ANN. § 91.005 (Vernon 1984).
173. 869 F.2d 865 (5th Cir. 1989).
174. Id. at 867.
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trial court entered a judgment n.o.v. for the tenant, 175 finding that the tenant
had not improperly induced the landlord's consent and that no language in
the lease supported the contention that the tenant must sell only quality fur-
niture. 176 In affirming the judgment n.o.v.,17 7 the Fifth Circuit agreed with
the trial court's findings. 178 The appellate panel then proceeded to answer a
question that was both hypothetical and unnecessary to the case's disposi-
tion: whether it would have been legal for the landlord to have withheld its
consent to the 1985 assignment. 179
The Fifth Circuit determined that the Texas Supreme Court had never
squarely addressed what constitutes a reasonable refusal to consent to an
assignment.180 After reviewing the relevant authority, the circuit judges
summarized the applicable law with the proposition that one determines the
reasonableness of a landlord's refusal to consent by reference to the terms
and conditions of the original lease.18' The appellate panel said that because
the lease did not obligate the tenant to maximize the percentage rent, the
landlord in B.M.B. could not lawfully have conditioned its consent on the
assignee's guarantee of a certain level of percentage rentals. 182
In an unpersuasive portion of the opinion, the Fifth Circuit purported to
distinguish cases from other jurisdictions holding that a landlord's objection
to an assignment is commercially reasonable when the proposed assignee
admits that it will be unable to generate gross sales sufficient to produce
percentage rental equal to that consistently paid by the existing lessee. 18 3
The court distinguished B.M.B. from those cases because in B.M.B. there
was no indication that the tenant could not eventually generate percentage
rental income equal to prior levels.' 84 One wonders how long the landlord
must wait for the rental to achieve prior levels and whether the Fifth Circuit
stands ready in the meantime to compensate the landlord for its lost income.
The court seems to lose sight of the fact that a landlord who is faced with an
assignment request must make an ex ante judgment; if the only basis for
concluding that an assignee could not generate equivalent rentals is the as-
signee's failure to do so over some long period of time, then as a practical
matter the landlord is precluded from ever objecting to a proposed assign-
ment. The Fifth Circuit's opinion would be more consistent if it simply said
175. Id.
176. Id.




181. Id. at 868-69 (citing Mitchell's, Inc. v. Nelms, 454 S.W.2d 809 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Dallas 1970, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Johnson, Correctly Interpreting Long-Term Leases Pursuant to
Modern Contract Law: Toward a Theory of Relational Leases, 74 VA. L. Rnv. 751, 763-64 &
n.41 (1988) (citing RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF PROPERTY § 15.2 reporter's note 7 (1976)).
182. 869 F.2d at 869.
183. Id. at 868 & n.2 (citing John Hogan Enters., Inc. v. Kellogg, 187 Cal. App.3d 589, 231
Cal. Rptr. 711 (1986); Haack v. Great Ad. & Pac. Tea Co., 603 S.W.2d 645 (Mo. Ct. App.
1980)). California courts have placed greater restrictions on landlords than have Texas courts
as regards the right to withhold consent to a sublease or assignment. See Reynolds v. McCul-




that an expected drop in percentage rental can never constitute a reasonable
basis for objecting to a sublease unless the lease obligates the tenant to maxi-
mize percentage rental.
It remains to be seen whether Texas courts will build on the Fifth Cir-
cuit's analysis or whether B.M.B. instead will be quietly brushed into the
deep dustbin of obiter dicta. In all events, landlords willing to constrain
their discretion by a reasonableness standard would be prudent to stipulate
in their leases the grounds upon which they can object to a proposed
assignment.
In contrast to the sometimes unconstrained analysis in B.M.B., the Fifth
Circuit's opinion in Chapman & Cole v. Itel Container International B. V 185
is a model of methodical contract construction. In Chapman the tenant of a
shipping container yard had specified that the yard's surface would need to
support a certain maximum equipment weight. The landlord constructed
such a yard in accordance with a lease provision that required the landlord
to deliver the facility at the lease's commencement in a "turn-key" condi-
tion. The weight specified by the tenant proved grossly inadequate, however,
causing the yard's surface to crack. When the landlord insisted that repairs
were the obligation of the tenant as provided in the lease, the tenant aban-
doned the premises, prompting the landlord's suit.
In its appeal of the trial court's judgment for the landlord,18 6 the tenant
contended that the "turn-key" language obligated the landlord to construct
a suitable facility and that the landlord bore all risks incident to that task.
The appellate court acknowledged that turn-key language normally imports
such a duty,18 7 but said that the trial court had correctly looked to the entire
lease in disregarding the phrase's normal meaning.188 The appellate court
pointed out that the lease contained the tenant's acceptance of the premises
in their existing condition on the commencement date,189 included the ten-
ant's acknowledgement that the landlord made no representation as to the
suitability of the premises for the conduct of tenant's business, 190 and set
forth the tenant's indemnity of the landlord for losses arising from condi-
tions on the premises.191 In these circumstances, the tenant's mistaken spec-
ification caused the problems, and the lease provisions served to qualify the
turn-key provision by releasing the landlord from any possible liability for
the tenant's mistake. 92
185. 865 F.2d 676 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S.Ct. 201, 107 L.Ed.2d 155 (1989).
186. Id. at 680.
187. Id. at 681 (citing Hawaiian Indep. Refinery, Inc. v. United States, 697 F.2d 1063, 1065
n.4 (Fed. Cir.), cert denied, 464 U.S. 816 (1983)) citing Securities & Exch. Comm'n v. Senex
Corp., 399 F.Supp. 497, 500 n.I (E.D. Ky. 1975), aff'd, 534 F.2d 1240 (6th Cir. 1976); WEB-
STER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (1971 ed.).
188. Id. (citing Chapman v. Orange Rice Milling Co., 747 F.2d 981, 983 (5th Cir. 1984);
Glassman Constr. Co. v. Maryland City Plaza, Inc., 371 F.Supp. 1154, 1158 (D. Md. 1974),
aff'd, 530 F.2d 968 (4th Cir. 1975)).
189. 865 F.2d at 681.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 681-82.
192. Id. at 682 (citing Martin v. Vector Co., 498 F.2d 16, 25 (1st Cir. 1974); Mobile Hous.
Env'ts v. Barton & Barton, 432 F. Supp. 1343, 1346 (D. Colo. 1977)).
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Texas courts are split about whether commercial tenants are liable for
injuries to their customers that occur outside the premises under their con-
trol.193 The Dallas Court of Appeals has adhered to the common law con-
cept that the occupier of premises has no duty of care regarding conditions
outside the premises that the occupier has not caused, 194 while courts of
appeal in Houston, San Antonio, and Waco have imposed liability. 195 In
Johnson v. Tom Thumb Stores, Inc. 196 the Dallas court held its ground, rul-
ing that a grocery store was not liable for injuries sustained by a customer
who slipped and fell in the shopping center's common area. 197 The appeals
court distinguished the Texas Supreme Court decision in Renfro Drug Com-
pany v. Lewis 198 as one in which the common area was part of an entrance-
way contiguous to the leased premises. The appeals court also noted that in
Renfro, the lease obligated the tenant to keep the entranceway open at all
times, 199 whereas in Johnson the lease made the landlord responsible for
maintaining the common area.2°°
In Canteen Corporation v. Republic of Texas Properties, Inc 20 1 a Texas
appeals court held that a tenant's installation of food vending machines vio-
lated its lease. A lease clause required use of the premises as a restaurant.
The court stated that a lease clause giving the tenant a right of first refusal
on any installation of food vending machines in the building demonstrated
that vending machine operation was a different type of use from that con-
templated by restaurant use.202
C. Residential Leases
It was a banner year for the law of residential leases. Harris County's
eviction procedures survived a challenge to their constitutionality.20 3 Texas
district courts decided three cases arising under the residential leasing chap-
ter of the Texas Property Code 4 - an extraordinarily high number consid-
ering the cost of bringing such actions. In addition, the legislature amended
the leasing provisions in the Texas Property Code to increase the remedies
available to aggrieved tenants.205
193. See infra notes 14248 and accompanying text.
194. See Howe v. Kroger Co., 598 S.W.2d 929 ('ex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1980, no writ).
195. See, eg., Northwest Mal, Inc. v. Lubri-Lon Int'l, Inc., 681 S.W.2d 797 (Tex.App.-
Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e); Joseph v. Jet Air Freight Corp., 479 S.W.2d 325
(Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1972, writ ref'd n.r.e); Parking, Inc. v. Dalrymple, 375 S.W.2d 758
(Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1964, no writ).
196. 771 S.W.2d 582 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1989, writ denied).
197. Id. at 585.
198. 149 Tex. 507, 235 S.W.2d 609 (1950).
199. 771 S.W.2d at 585.
200. 771 S.W.2d at 584-85.
201. 773 S.W.2d 398 (Tex. App.-Da~las 1989, n.w.h.).
202. Id. at 400.
203. See infra notes 151-66 and accompanying text.
204. TEx. PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 92.001-.301 (Vernon 1984 and Supp. 1990). See infra
notes 167-82 and accompanying text.
205. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 92.006-009, .055(c), .056-.0563, .057(b), .057(d), .058-
.059, .301, 93.001-.003 (Vernon Supp. 1990), See infra notes 183-89 and accompanying text.
1990]
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
The challenge to the eviction procedures came in Merritt v. Harris
County,206 a class action which challenged a trial court holding that the pro-
cedures complied with the due process requirements of the state and federal
constitutions.207 Evidence at trial established that Harris County constables
would attempt to induce the tenant voluntarily to leave the premises before
serving the writ of restitution. Before executing the writ, the constables
would post a notice on the tenant's door advising the tenant to vacate within
a specified time period. If the tenant failed to leave, the constable's office
engaged a private moving and storage company to pack up the tenant's be-
longings and prepare an inventory of the property for attachment to the re-
turn of the writ or filing in the constable's office. If the tenant was present
during the writ's execution, the constable's office allowed the tenant to take
food, clothing, pets, and plants. The constable's office gave the tenant a busi-
ness card that identified the private movers and advised the tenant where he
could retrieve the property; if the tenant was not present, the constable's
office posted the card on the door of the premises. 208 The constable's office
then placed the property in storage and the tenant could retrieve it by pay-
ment of the moving and storage costs. If not claimed within 30 days, the
constable's office advertised the property was for sale and auctioned it.
The trial court had found that the sale procedure was defective because
evicted tenants frequently did not have adequate recourse to contest the
sale.2" 9 Moreover, property was sometimes sold without any statutory basis
or legal process.210 The trial court also had found that the constables and
their deputies did not participate in the sales.211 On appeal, the class action
tenants asserted that the restitution procedures did not afford the notice and
hearing that are said to be requisites of due process. In particular, the ten-
ants said that due process requires that a tenant be advised, prior to the
forcible entry and detainer trial in the justice court, about the entire restitu-
tion procedure that can result from a judgment for the landlord.
The appeals court took issue with the contention that the tenants had no
notice of the consequences attending an eviction.212 The court said that the
judgments in the justice court constituted notice to the tenants that post-
judgment proceedings would follow. 21 3 Additionally, the court noted,
before executing the writs of eviction the constables delivered notice to de-
faulting tenants advising them to vacate within a specified period.214 Citing
the United States Supreme Court's opinion in Mathews v. Eldridge,21 5 the
206. 775 S.W.2d 17 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1989, writ denied).
207. Id. at 20.
208. The procedure followed by the Harris County constables appears to be consonant
with, and in some ways accords the tenant more protections than, the procedures required by
TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 24.0061 (Vernon Supp. 1990), which governs the issuance and exe-
cution of writs of possession.
209. 775 S.W.2d at 20.
210. Id. at 20-21.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 22.
213. Id. at 21.
214. Id.
215. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
[Vol. 44
REAL PROPERTY
appeals court said that assessing the adequacy of the restitution procedures
requires weighing (1) the private interest affected by the constables' action,
(2) the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest, (3) the probable
value of any additional or substitute procedural safeguards, and (4) the
state's interest, including the financial and administrative burdens that addi-
tional procedures would entail.216 The appeals court found that the proce-
dures at issue adequately accommodated these competing interests.217 The
appellate court agreed with the trial court that no constitutional purpose
would be served by adding any notice or hearing requirements. 218 Further,
the appeals court held that the safe and reasonable storage of the tenants'
property was more desirable than placing the belongings on the street219 and
thereby risking theft, violation of city ordinances, and infringement on the
neighborhood's quality of life.220
The tenants next claimed that even if the constable properly seized the
property, the tenants were nonetheless entitled to reclaim it by paying rea-
sonable storage charges. Noting that the trial court had found that the fees
charged by the private warehousemen were unreasonable, 221 the tenants
contended that Harris County and its constables were liable under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983222 because the constables were intimately involved with the ware-
housemen. The appeals court held that the requisite causal connection be-
tween the constables' acts and the constitutional deprivation of the tenant's
property223 was lacking because the constables did not participate either in
setting the storage charges or in the sales conducted by the warehouse-
men.224 The constables were merely executing writs of restitution, which are
orders of the court.225
Lastly, the tenants argued that the constables were the final policymaking
authorities within their precincts regarding writs of restitution, that the
practice of entrusting the goods with private warehousemen was part of that
policy, and that Harris County was therefore liable for the constitutional
infringements of the warehousemen. The appeals court disagreed, holding
the execution of writs is a narrowly circumscribed duty that does not involve
any policymaking. 226 While the constables do have some limited discretion
in some areas, said the appeals court, "they do not define the objectives of a
writ of restitution nor do they prescribe the excessive storage charges levied
216. 775 S.W.2d at 21 (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 335).




221. Id. at 23.
222. That statute provides that any person who under color of state law deprives another of
any legal right is liable to the injured party. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1981).
223. 775 S.W.2d at 23 (citing Lozano v. Smith, 718 F.2d 756 (5th Cir. 1983)). The court in
Lozano stated that a causal connection exists when a constitutional deprivation results from
implementation of a wrongful policy. 718 F.2d at 768.
224. 775 S.W.2d at 23-24.
225. Id.
226. Id. at 24 (citing Rhode v. Denson, 776 F.2d 107, 109-10 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied,
476 U.S. 1170 (1986)).
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by the private warehousemen." 227
Waldon v. Williams,228 one of a trio of Survey cases arising out of residen-
tial lease disputes, held that a trial court's award of a rental reduction under
Section 92.056(b)(2) of the Texas Property Code2 29 did not preclude an addi-
tional award under Section 92.056(b)(4) 230 for actual damages prior to the
entry of the order.23 1 The trial court had determined that the landlord's
failure to repair diminished the value of the premises by $110 per month232
and accordingly ordered a rental reduction in that amount until the repairs
were completed. 233 The trial court believed, however, that the statute pre-
cluded the court from additionally awarding damages for the 15 months
during which the landlord had wrongfully failed to make the repair prior to
entry of the 'order.234 The appeals court traced the history of Section
92.056,235 determined the tenant was damaged, 236 calculated the actual
damages based on the difference between contract rental and the rental value
of the premises without the repair, 237 and concluded that the trial court was
obliged to award damages.2 38
Since Waldon, the legislature has recodified Section 92.056(b) as Section
92.0563(a). 239 In addition, the legislature has deleted the language allowing
the tenant one or more of the five specified remedies. 24° The amended Sec-
tion 92.056(b), however, allows the tenant to obtain the "judicial remedies"
of Section 92.0563(a); 241 thus it is probable that Waldon remains good law.
Benser v. Johnson 24 2 vindicates the wisdom of Section 92.153(b)(1) of the
Texas Property Code, 24 3 which requires a landlord who is requested to do so
by the tenant to install a window latch on each exterior window. In Benser,
after the tenant complained that the window locks did not work, the land-
lord installed a defective "screw type" lock, which enabled an intruder to
open the window, enter the apartment, and rape one of its occupants. In
affirming a judgment against the landlord based on negligence, 244 the ap-
227. Id. at 25 (citing Rhode v. Denson, 776 F.2d at 109).
228. 760 S.W.2d 833 (Tex. App.-Austin 1988, n.w.h.).
229. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 92.056(b)(2) (Vernon 1984), amended by TEX. PROP.
CODE ANN., § 92.0563(a)(2) (Vernon Supp. 1990).
230. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 92.056(b)(4) (Vernon 1984), amended by TEX. PROP.
CODE ANN. § 92.0563(a)(4) (Vernon Supp. 1990).
231. 760 S.W.2d at 835.
232. Id. at 834.
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Id at 834-35.
236. Id. at 835.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 92.0563(a) (Vernon Supp. 1990, amending TEx. PROP.
CODE ANN. § 92.056(b) (Vernon 1984).
240. Id.
241. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 92.056(b)(4) (Vernon Supp. 1990).
242. 763 S.W.2d 793 (rex. App.-Dallas 1988, writ denied).
243. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 92.153(b)(1) (Vernon 1984).
244. 763 S.W.2d at 794.
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peals court cited Sections 92.052(a)245 and 92.153(a)-(b)(1) 246 of the Texas
Property Code as constituting some evidence that the defective locks were a
significant causative factor in bringing about the injury24 7
In the trio's third case, Reed v. Ford,248 the tenant had made a security
deposit under a printed lease which required that, no fewer than 30 days
before the end of the primary term, the tenant give notice of whether he
intended to vacate or negotiate a renewal. The security deposit provision
required that the tenant give the 30-day notice as a condition to recovering
the deposit. The tenant neither gave notice of termination nor signed a re-
newal agreement. Instead, after expiration of the primary term, the tenant
continued to make rental payments, the landlord duly accepted such rental
payments, and the two parties discussed renewal. When those discussions
broke down, the landlord announced that he considered the tenant to be a
holdover pursuant to a lease provision requiring holdover rental at double
the primary term rate and demanded that the tenant vacate within five days.
The tenant did so and surrendered the premises in excellent condition. The
landlord refused to return the security deposit, claiming that the tenant had
forfeited it by failing to give the requisite 30-day notice prior to the end of
the primary term and asserting that he was holding the deposit to offset
holdover rentals.
The tenant brought suit, claiming that the landlord's retention was in bad
faith and that the tenant was entitled to $100, three times the amount of his
deposit, and attorneys' fees. The trial court directed a verdict for the land-
lord.249 The trial court held that the tenant had forfeited the deposit when it
failed to give notice 30 days before the end of the primary term.250
In reversing the trial court, the appeals court construed the lease as re-
quiring only that the tenant give 30 days notice prior to termination in order
to recover the deposit.25 1 The court noted that the landlord's demand for an
immediate vacation had prevented the tenant from fulfilling the notice re-
quirement and therefore deemed the requirement to have been met.25 2 The
court found that sufficient evidence of the landlord's bad faith existed to
require submitting the issue to a jury.253
A number of the 1989 amendments to the Texas Property Code serve to
expand the rights and remedies of aggrieved residential tenants. Besides the
changes to Texas Property Code discussed elsewhere in this article,254 the
245. TEx. PROP. CODE ANN. § 92.052(a) (Vernon 1984).
246. Tax. PROP. CODE ANN. § 92.153(a)-(b)(1) (Vernon 1984).
247. 763 S.W.2d at 795-97.
248. 760 S.W.2d 26 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1988, n.w.h.).
249. Id. at 28.
250. Id.
251. Id. at 29 (citing Frank v. Kuhnreich, 546 S.W.2d 844, 848 (Tex. Civ. App.-San
Antonio 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (construction resulting in forfeiture is to be avoided if there is a
reasonable alternative construction available)).
252. Id. (citing Sargent v. Highlite Broadcasting Co., 466 S.W.2d 866, 867 (rex. Civ.
App.-Austin 1971, no writ)).
253. Id. at 30.
254. See supra text accompanying notes 8, 150, 172-73.
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Texas Legislature performed a major overhaul on Property Code provisions.
The salient changes include an expansion of the tenant's remedies in the
event the landlord closes a rental unit after the tenant has given notice of a
required repair,25 5 a more precise delineation of the steps that a tenant must
take in order to hold a landlord liable for failure to repair,256 a more exten-
sive list of remedies available to the tenant when the landlord is liable,257 and
creation of a procedure whereby a landlord, by delivering a good-faith affida-
vit explaining why repairs cannot be timely completed despite diligent efforts
to do so, can obtain up to a 30-day extension. 258
Texas lawmakers also amended the Texas Property Code to stipulate that
the only defenses to non-payment of rent that a tenant may assert in an
eviction suit are unlawful retaliation by the landlord pursuant to Section
92.057,259 lawful rent deduction pursuant to Section 92.0561 by reason of a
landlord's failure to make required repairs, 26° and lawful rent deduction
pursuant to Section 92.301 by reason of an interruption of utilities.261 The
amendment says that no other judicial action under the residential tenancies
subchapter may be joined with or asserted as a defense or crossclaim in an
eviction suit.262 An amendment to Section 24.005 of the Texas Property
Code263 stipulates that the purchaser at a foreclosure sale wishing to termi-
nate the tenancy of a residential tenant whose lease is inferior to the fore-
closed lien must give the tenant at least 30 days' written notice to vacate
following the foreclosure. 2 "
Section 92.006(f) permits a landlord and tenant to agree that, except in
instances of the landlord's negligence, the tenant is liable for (1) damages
from wastewater stoppages caused by foreign or improper objects in lines
that exclusively serve the tenant's dwelling, (2) damage to doors, windows,
or screens, and (3) damage resulting from windows or doors left open.265
These exclusions seem highly sensible. Indeed, it is hard to imagine why
landlords (and, by extension, other tenants) should subsidize a tenant's neg-
ligence in such instances.
Unfortunately, the Texas legislature added conditions to such an agree-
ment. It decreed that the agreement must be underlined or printed in bold-
face, must be "specific and clear," and must be "made knowingly,
voluntarily, and for consideration. '266 These additional conditions are re-
flective of an intensifying move away from the view that individuals are at
liberty to make voluntary agreements and toward the view that the law
255. TEx. PROP. CODE ANN. § 92.055(c)(2) (Vernon Supp. 1990).
256. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 92.056(a) (Vernon Supp. 1990).
257. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 92.056(b), .0561, 0563 (Vernon Supp. 1990).
258. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 92.0562 (Vernon Supp. 1990).
259. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 92.057 (Vernon 1984 and Supp. 1990).
260. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 92.0561 (Vernon Supp. 1990).
261. TEx. PROP. CODE ANN. § 92.301 (Vernon Supp. 1990).
262. TEx. PROP. CODE ANN. § 92.059 (Vernon Supp. 1990).
263. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 24.005 (Vernon Supp. 1990)).
264. Id.
265. Tex. PROP. CODE ANN. § 92.006(f) (Vernon Supp. 1990).
266. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 92.006(e)(4) (Vernon Supp. 1990).
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should treat contracting adults as wards of the court. The conditions to
Section 92.006(f) are a festering carbuncle on the otherwise smooth cheek of
the Property Code. If legislation of this type continues to be fashionable,
written agreements will come to resemble pharmaceutical labels, and con-
tract disputes will less and less involve determining what the parties meant,
and will more and more involve discovering ways to loose the parties from
their express undertakings because one of them forgot to say "Mother, may
D. Commercial Leases
The Texas legislature overruled two lockout cases from last year's Sur-
vey267 by creating Chapter 93 of the Texas Property Code to govern com-
mercial tenancies. 268 Included in the new chapter are provisions governing
interruption of utilities, removal of a tenant's property, and lock-outs. 269
Section 93.001 makes clear that the new chapter applies only to commercial
rental property, which is defined as all rental property not covered by Chap-
ter 92.270 Section 93.002, entitled "Interruption of Utilities, Removal of
Property, and Exclusion of Commercial Tenant," is the analogue of Section
92.008 governing residential tenancies.271 The two provisions proscribe the
identical behavior: cutting off utilities, removing property absent a tenant's
abandonment, and lock-outs.272 The commercial lease provision addition-
ally creates a presumption that the tenant has abandoned the premises when
the tenant begins to move its business property off site,273 and allows the
landlord to remove, store, and eventually sell abandoned property.274 Both
statutes require the landlord to place a notice on the tenant's front door
267. Fossi & Weller 1989 Annual Survey, supra note 11, at 257, 269-70 (discussing PRC
Kentron, Inc. v. First City Center Assoc's., H1, 762 S.W.2d 279 (Tex. App.-Daflas 1988, writ
denied)) Design Center Venture v. Overseas Multi-Projects Corp., 748 S.W.2d 469 (Tex.
App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, writ denied) PRC Kentron, Inc. and Design Center Venture
held that the lock-out statute in effect when these cases were decided was inapplicable to com-
mercial leases. Design Center Venture v. Overseas Multi-Projects Corp., 748 S.W.2d at 472-
74; PRC Kentron, Inc. v. First City Center Assoc's., 762 S.W.2d at 286; TEx. PROP. CODE
ANN. § 91.002 (Vernon 1984), amended by TEx. PROP. CODE ANN. § 92.008 (Vernon Supp.
1990).
268. Tax. PROP. CODE ANNl. § 93.001-.003 (Vernon Supp. 1990).
269. Id.
270. Id. § 93.001.
271. Id. §§ 92.008, 93.002.
272. Id. Subsection (a) of each statute prohibits a landlord from interrupting utility services
except in the event of repairs or emergency, subsection (b) prohibits a landlord from removing
property on the premises except for prompt repair or replacement, and subsection (c) prohibits
a landlord from locking out a tenant without judicial process except for repairs, emergency, to
remove abandoned property, and for changing the locks of a tenant who is delinquent in rent
payments. Id.
273. TEx. PROP. CODE ANN. § 93.002 (d) (Vernon Supp. 1990).
274. Act of June 14, 1989, ch. 689 § 2, 1989 Tex. Gen. Laws 3184, 3186 (to be codified at
TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 93.002 (e) (Vernon Supp. 1990)). The tenant has 60 days after
storage within which to claim abandoned property; the landlord is required to deliver notice to
the tenant's last known address advising that if not claimed within 60 days the property may
be sold. Id. The statute does not indicate whether the tenant is required to pay delinquent
rental before reclaiming the property. Presumably, sales proceeds are to be applied to storage
costs and delinquent rental.
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advising of where a new key can be obtained. 275
Can a statute be construed to permit certain behavior if the statute does
not expressly proscribe that behavior? An interesting difference between the
two lock-out statutes may soon cause courts to confront that question. The
residential statute requires that the landlord provide a new key to the tenant
"at any hour, regardless of whether or not the tenant pays any of the delin-
quent rent."'276 The commercial statute, by contrast, states that a new key
need be provided "only during the tenant's regular business hours," 277 but
does not indicate whether the landlord must furnish a new key to a tenant
whose rent is delinquent.
Another important difference between the residential and commercial ver-
sions exists. A tenant cannot waive the protections of the residential lock-
out statute.278 On the other hand, the commercial statute is invalid to the
extent of any conflict with the provisions of the lease.279
E. Landlord's Rights and Remedies
In Marynick v. Bockelmann 280 a husband and wife were the tenants under
a lease that provided for year-to-year holdover terms with rent at the pri-
mary term rate. Shortly before the end of the initial term, the tenants sepa-
rated and the wife moved out. The husband abandoned the premises during
the second holdover term, prompting the landlord's suit for past due rent
and repairs to the premises.
The appeals court reversed the trial court's finding that the wife was not
liable under the lease.28' It noted that the only case on point 282 held that
where two tenants hold jointly and only one occupies after the expiration of
the initial term, both remain liable unless the one not in actual possession
gives notice to the landlord advising that he has vacated.283 The appeals
court said it did not matter that the landlord knew the couple was sepa-
rated;284 the wife continued to have rights under the lease and needed to take
some affirmative act as regarded the landlord to terminate her liability.28 5
One judge dissented, noting that the case relied on by the majority held only
that the holdover of one of two joint tenants will be presumed to be the
holdover of both, but that the presumption was rebuttable.286
Other Survey cases illustrated solid but undramatic instances of constru-
275. TEx. PROP. CODE ANN. § 92.008(d) (Vernon Supp. 1990); TEX. PROP. CODE ANN.
§ 93.002(f) (Vernon Supp. 1990).
276. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 92.008(d)(2) (Vernon Supp. 1990).
277. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 93.002(f) (Vernon Supp. 1990).
278. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 92.008(f) (Vernon Supp. 1990).
279. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 93.002(h) (Vernon Supp. 1990)).
280. 773 S.W.2d 665 (rex. App.-Dallas 1989, writ granted).
281. Id. at 667.
282. Fronty v. Wood, 20 S.C.L. (2 Hill) 367 (1834).
283. Id. at 367.
284. 773 S.W.2d at 669.
285. Id. at 669-70.




ing leases and applying settled law. In Dyer v. Weedon 287 the appeals court
chided the trial court for granting an injunction in favor of a bankrupt land-
lord seeking to oust a tenant.288 Noting that the landlord's bankruptcy peti-
tion had the effect of invoking an automatic stay against continuation of
legal proceedings against the debtor,28 9 the court held that the overwhelm-
ing weight of authority supported the proposition that the debtor is similarly
disabled from asserting claims or counterclaims. 290
Miller v. Vineyard291 required the appeals court to determine the legal
significance of several statements made by a landlord to a tenant who had
abandoned the premises and stopped paying rent. The court determined
that the landlord's statement that the lease was terminated until he got paid
was not sufficient to rescind the lease and thereby cut off any further liability
of the tenant.292 "[A] layman's loose usage of a word with possible legal
significance is not conclusive evidence of his ntent.' ' 293 However, according
to the court, the following colloquy between the narrator landlord (Jerry)
and the tenant (Jack) was not sufficient to constitute a demand for payment
by the landlord that would allow the landlord to recover attorneys' fees:
And at that time I asked him, I says, "Jack, what is going on?" And he
said, "Jerry, [sic] I lost my ass out there and closed it down." And I
said, "Well, Jack, I don't even have the keys to the place, nothing, you
know."294
Ernest Hemingway could not more succinctly have captured the dispirited
state of the Texas real estate market at decade's end.
In Chapman & Cole v. Itel Container International B. V.295 the appeals
court affirmed a trial court holding that a landlord's failure to credit the
tenant with either the fair market value of the unexpired lease term or the
amount of payments received from subsequent tenants precludes the land-
lord from claiming any future rent.296 Finally, in Downwind Aviation, Inc. v.
Orange County,2 9 7 the appeals court affirmed a trial court holding that a
tenant's failure to furnish a certificate naming the landlord as an additional
insured on a liability policy constituted an event of default under a lease
containing such a requirement.298
287. 769 S.W.2d 711 (Tex. App.-Waco 1989, n.w.h.).
288. Id. at 713.
289. Id. (noting automatic stay of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (1989).
290. 769 S.W.2d at 713-14 (discussing Association of St. Croix Condominium Owners v.
St. Croix Hotel Corp., 682 F.2d 446, 448-49 (3d Cir. 1982); Howard v. Howard, 670 S.W.2d
737, 739-40 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1984, no writ); In re Critical Fork Coal Corp., 18
Bankr. 422, 423 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1982)).
291. 765 S.W.2d 865 (Tex. App.-Austin 1989, writ denied).
292. Id. at 868.
293. Id.
294. Id. at 870.
295. 865 F.2d 676 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S.Ct. 201, 107 L.Ed.2d 155 (1989).
296. Id. at 687-89.
297. 761 S.W.2d-455 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1988, writ denied).
298. Id. at 459.
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III. TITLE AND CONVEYANCING
A. Generally
The Texas Supreme Court's decision in Ojeda de Toca v. Wise,299 which
held that a buyer of real property may sue under the DTPA for failure to
disclose information even when the undisclosed information is the subject of
a recorded instrument, began to bite this year in ECC Parkway Joint Venture
v. Baldwin.300 In ECC a land buyer discovered a prior deed restriction, al-
legedly undisclosed by the seller, the seller's real estate broker, and the title
company, limiting building heights to 30 feet. The buyer sued everyone in-
volved, and a welter of cross-claims and counterclaims resulted.
In an opinion of admirable clarity, the court of appeals made a number of
holdings that may come to alter the way in which lawyers draft purchase
and sale agreements. First, citing Ojeda de Toca, the court held that the
buyer's constructive knowledge of the height restriction from the deed
records was no defense to the seller's fraud and DTPA claims against the
seller and its broker.30' Taking Ojeda de Toca one step further, the court
found no reason why Ojeda de Toca should not also allow the buyer's claims
for negligent misrepresentation and breach of fiduciary duty.30 2
Second, the court was called upon to interpret Dallas Joint Stock Land
Bank v. Harrison,30 3 a case in which the seller represented that a certain
mineral lease covered only 100 acres of the 440-acre subject tract, furnished
the buyer with an abstract of title, agreed that the buyer could object to any
title defects discovered therein, and stipulated that the seller would be re-
quired to warrant title only to those minerals it actually owned. When the
buyer discovered after closing that the mineral lease in question covered the
entire 440-acre tract, he sued for fraud. The Texas Supreme Court rejected
the claim, holding that because the abstract disclosed the lease, and the lease
quite clearly indicated that it covered the entire tract, the seller was exoner-
ated from liability.3°4
The seller in ECC, noting that he had furnished a title commitment to his
buyer and given him an opportunity to object to the state of title, argued that
Dallas Joint Stock stands for the proposition that a real estate buyer who
contracts to look solely to certain title information cannot later complain to
the seller about title problems. The court disagreed, noting that Dallas Joint
Stock differed from ECC in several crucial respects.305 First, in Dallas Joint
Stock the title abstract listed the mineral lease and the buyer could thereby
have determined what property the lease covered. 30 6 In ECC, on the other
hand, the height restriction was absent from the title policy and the buyer
299. 748 S.W.2d 449 (Tex. 1988), discussed in Fossi & Weler, 1989 Annual Survey, supra
note 11 at 274-75).
300. 765 S.W.2d 504 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1989, writ denied).
301. Id. at 509.
302. Id.
303. 138 Tex. 84, 156 S.W.2d 963 (1941).
304. Id. at 966.




had no means of discovering it from the policy. 30 7
In addition to this, the appeals court in ECC held that the doctrine of
merger 308 did not bar the claims against the seller because the doctrine is
inapplicable in instances of fraud, accident, or mistake in the transactions
leading up to the deed.309 Finally, in remanding the case for further findings
on a host of fact issues, the appellate court held that the trial court properly
dismissed the indemnity and contribution claims by the seller and the broker
against the two title companies involved (both of which had already settled
with the buyer).310 A title company's duty, the court said, is not to advise as
to the state of title, but merely to insure against any loss suffered by the
insured party by reason of title defects.311 Because, as a general matter, no
action for contribution or indemnity lies against a party who has no liability
to the injured party, the court allowed no such action against the title com-
panies in this case.312
B. Reformation
In Hamberlin v. Longview Bank & Trust Co. 313 the buyer accepted a deed
despite his noticing that the deed's property description included four lots in
addition to the one he had contracted to purchase. The seller subsequently
sued to reform the deed by excluding the extra lots. The appeals court ulti-
mately affirmed the trial court's holding that the inclusion of the additional
lots, coupled with the buyer's knowledge of the mistake, entitled the seller to
reformation. 314
The court refused to allow reformation in Lathem v. Richey315 because
the party seeking the relief had waited too long. In Lathem the grantor
under a deed filed suit more than four years after the conveyance, claiming
that by reason of mutual mistake the deed failed to reserve a mineral inter-
est. Later, the grantor amended his petition to allege the grantee's unilateral
mistake and fraud. In affirming a summary judgment in favor of the
307. Id.
308. The doctrine of merger has been summarized as follows:
When a deed is delivered and accepted as performance of a contract to convey,
the contract is merged in the deed. Though the terms of the deed may vary
from those contained in the contract, still the deed must be looked to alone to
determine the rights of the parties. No rule of law is better settled than that
where a deed has been executed and accepted as performance of an executory
contract to convey real estate, the contract is functus officio and the rights of the
parties rest thereafter solely in the deed.
Alvarado v. Bolton, 749 S.W.2d 47, 49 (Tex. 1988).
309. 765 S.W.2d at 512 (citing Commercial Bank, Unincorporated v. Satterwhite, 413
S.W.2d 905, 909 (rex. 1967)).
310. Id. at 513.
311. Id. (citing, inter alia, Prendergast v. Southern Title Guar. Co., 454 S.W.2d 803 (rex.
Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1970, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
312. Id. (citing, inter alia, Hunter v. Fort Worth Capital Corp., 620 S.W.2d 547, 553 (rex.
1981)).
313. 770 S.W.2d 12 (rex. App.-Texarkana 1989, writ denied).
314. Id. at 14 (citing, inter alia, Ace Drug Marts, Inc. v. Sterling, 502 S.W.2d 935 (rex.
Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
315. 772 S.W.2d 249 (rex. App.-Dallas 1989, writ denied).
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grantee, the appeals court agreed with the grantor that the four-year statute
of limitations does not commence to run until the mistake or fraud is discov-
ered or should have been discovered. 316 The court observed, however, that
where the grantor seeks reformation, he is presumed to have knowledge of
the contents of his deed from the date of its execution. 317 The presumption
is rebuttable, but none of the excusing circumstances was present here,
where the grantor's attorney prepared the deed and the grantor read the
deed, albeit hurriedly, before signing it.318
C. Title Insurance
Stewart Title Guaranty Co. v. Cheatham319 arose when the contract pur-
chaser of an apartment complex backed out of the deal upon discovering a
storm sewer easement which was not reflected in the original owner's title
policy. The owner sued the title company under the DTPA, basing its claim
on the policy's preamble stating that the insurer "for value does hereby guar-
antee ... [that] the Insured has good and indefeasible title" to the prop-
erty.320 The appeals court, however, construed this language in light of the
entire policy, and held (as did the appeals court in the ECC case discussed
earlier) that the title policy was a contract of indemnity and not of guar-
anty.32' Accordingly, absent special circumstances, the policy did not obli-
gate the title company to examine for title defects, but merely obligated it to
indemnify against losses suffered by reason of such defects. 322 The court
warned, however, that an insurer's failure to fulfill its indemnity obligation
under the terms of the agreement would constitute an actionable breach of
the insurer's contractual undertaking. 323
A court did find that the special circumstances absent from Cheatham
were present in Stewart Title Guaranty Co. v. Sterling.324 In Sterling a con-
tract buyer noticed from a survey that persons other than the seller owned
three of the lots he was to purchase. Concerned that failure to acquire the
lots would jeopardize his development plan, the buyer called the title com-
pany's attention to the matter, but the title company assured him that he
would receive title to those three lots as part of his purchase. In fact,
though, recorded warranty deeds reflected that parties other than the seller
were the owners of the lots in question.
When he discovered that title to the three lots was defective, the buyer
invoked the Texas Insurance Code325 and the DTPA in his suit against the
316. Id. at 253.
317. Id. (citing, e.g., Sullivan v. Barnett, 471 S.W.2d 39, 45 (Tex. 1971)).
318. Id. at 253-254.
319. 764 S.W.2d 315 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1988, writ denied).
320. Id. at 318.
321. Id.
322. Id. at 319.
323. Id. at 319 n.3.
324. 772 S.W.2d 242 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1989, writ requested).
325. The buyer brought its claim under TEx. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.21, § 16 (Vernon
Supp. 1990). The buyer was allowed to incorporate therein the delnitions of unfair claims
settlement practice set forth in TEx. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.21-2 even though art. 21.21-2
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title company. The title company had attempted to shield itself with the
rights of parties in possession exception in the title policy, but was rebuffed
at trial by reason of a State Board of Insurance Rule that prohibits the exclu-
sion from title coverage of any defects that public records reveal.3 26 In af-
firming the trial court, the appeals court held that while Texas law usually
obligates a title company to act only as an indemnitor of title and imposes no
duty to discover title defects, a court can hold a title company liable in in-
stances such as this where the title company misrepresents or fails to disclose
material facts. 327
D. Perpetuities
In Randolph v. Terrel132s the appeals court affirmed the validity of a
deed's option provision giving the grantors the right to repurchase the prop-
erty at a price equal to the sum of the price paid by the grantees and the fair
market value of improvements subsequently constructed thereon.329 The
court found that the option was an indirect restraint on alienation 330 and
was, therefore, distinguishable from direct restraints on alienation.331 The
court classified the option provision as "a promissory preemptory restraint
on alienation" under the Restatement (Second) of Property (1981), and as-
sessed its validity under the guidelines set forth in Sections 4.2(3)(a)-(f) of
the Restatement. 332 The Randolph court construed the option as granting to
does not itself create a private cause of action, by reason of Vail v. Texas Farm Bureau Mut.
Ins. Co., 754 S.W.2d 129 (Tex. 1988).
326. 772 S.W.2d at 245.
327. Id. at 247 (citing Gibbs v. Main Bank of Houston, 666 S.W.2d 554, 560 (Tex App.-
Houston [1st Dist.] 1984, no writ), which held that title companies are liable for misrepresen-
tation and nondisclosure claims arising under the DTPA despite the traditional rule that title
companies act only as indemnitors against failure of title).
328. 768 S.W.2d 736 (rex. App.-Tyler 1987, writ denied).
329. Id.
330. Id. at 738.
331. Id. at 737 (citing the following cases as examples of direct restraints against alienation:
O'Connor v. Thetford, 174 S.W. 680 (rex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1915, writ ref'd), which
voided a provision prohibiting alienation; Seay v. Cockrell, 102 Tex. 280, 115 S.W. 1160
(1909), which voided a will provision prohibiting the devisees from selling property devised to
them during their life; and Pritchett v. Badgett, 257 S.W.2d 776 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso
1953, writ ref'd), which voided a will provision prohibiting the devisee from selling or mort-
gaging property devised to him for 20 years unless joined by the executors).
332. 768 S.W.2d at 738. The factors set forth in RFSrATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY
§ 4.2(3)(a)-(f) (1981) (Donative Transfers) are as follows:
a. The restraint is limited in duration;
b. The restraint is limited to allow a substantial variety of types of transfers to
be employed;
c. The restraint is limited as to the number of persons to whom transfer is
prohibited;
d. The restraint is such that it tends to increase the value of the property
involved;
e. The restraint is imposed upon an interest that is not otherwise readily mar-
ketable; or
f. The restraint is imposed upon property that is not readily marketable.
Id If one of the enumerated factors is present, then the restraint may be found reasonable.
768 S.W.2d at 739. The court found the rule of Restatement § 4.2(3) consistent with the
reasoning of the Texas Supreme Court in Mattem v. Herzog, 367 S.W.2d 312 (rex. 1963). Id.
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the grantors a right to repurchase the property during their life if offered for
sale by the grantees during their life.333 Because the option was limited to
the lifetimes of the grantors and grantees, and because the sale involved a
transfer between members of the same family of an undivided interest in
property, the court held that the restraint was allowable.334
E. Lis Pendens
Olbrich v. Touchy 335 is, in essence, a case that addresses who has standing
to file a lis pendens notice. In Olbrich landowners filed their subdivision
plats in the county map records before the city council approved the subdivi-
sion. Owners of adjacent land brought suit claiming that the subdivision was
invalid because the plats had been filed in violation of city ordinances and
state statutes. The adjacent landowners also filed a notice of lis pendens
under Section 12.007(a) of the Texas Property Code. In overturning the
trial court's refusal to cancel the notice of lis pendens, the appeals court
observed that for the notice to be valid, the statute required either that the
adjacent landowners have an interest in the subdivision land or that the al-
leged violations of law constitute an encumbrance on that land.336 The
court acknowledged that the requisite interest in the land could be less than
title, but said that the interest must amount to more than mere third party
concern.337 The appeals court also rejected the argument that the alleged
violations of law amounted to an encumbrance. The court said that the pur-
pose of the lis pendens notice is to advise interested parties of the pendency
of a suit. Here, though, the statutory restrictions on the subdivision of prop-
erty were sufficient to alert prospective purchasers of the violations, and thus
made the lis pendens notice superfluous. 338 The court pointed out that the
adjacent landowners could properly have sought relief by means of a tempo-
rary restraining order.339
In Gene Hill Equipment Co. v. Merriman 340 the wife in a divorce proceed-
ing filed a notice of lis pendens describing the affected property as "all...
property owned by or recorded in the name of either of the parties to the
divorce, which may be located in Travis County, Texas.1 341 The appeals
court affirmed a summary judgment holding that the notice was a sufficient
"description of the property affected" for purposes of Section 12.007(b)(5) of
the Texas Property Code,3 4 2 and was adequate to put the transferee on no-
tice that title to the land in question was in dispute.343
333. 768 S.W.2d at 738.
334. Id. at 740.
335. 780 S.W.2d 6 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1989, no writ).
336. Id. at 7.
337. Id.
338. Id.
339. Id. at 8.
340. 771 S.W.2d 207 (Tex. App.-Austin 1989, no writ).
341. Id. at 208.
342. Tax. PROP. CODE ANN. § 12.007(b)(5) (Vernon 1984).
343. 771 S.W.2d at 209.
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Khraish v. Hamed344 arose out of a trial court's order that a notice of lis
pendens be removed.345 The party filing the notice sought an interlocutory
appeal, arguing that the trial court's actions of not only cancelling the order
but also prohibiting the refiling of other notices against the identical prop-
erty were tantamount to a temporary injunction and thus properly the sub-
ject of an interlocutory appeal.346 The appeals court disagreed, holding that
the notice was improperly filed because it was collateral to the underlying
lawsuit.347 The order, therefore, did not contain elements of a temporary
injunction. 34s The court held, moreover, that in instances where a notice of
lis pendens is invalid in the first instance, the property owner need not com-
ply with the requirements of Section 12.008 of the Texas Property Code to
obtain an order cancelling the notice.349
In TEVE Holdings Ltd. v. Jackson 350 the parties filing the lis pendens had
prevailed in a lawsuit for fraud and DTPA violations, and obtained a con-
structive trust on condominiums purchased with proceeds derived from the
fraud-feasor's misconduct. After the filing of the lis pendens and the entry
of the judgment in the underlying suit, TEVE acquired the condominiums
from the fraud-feasor. Several months later, pursuant to a court order, the
condominiums were sold at a sheriff's sale and purchased by the judgment
creditors. When those creditors sued to establish title to the condominiums,
the trial court granted summary judgment in their favor.
Relying on Moss v. Tennant,351 TEVE argued on appeal that the lis
pendens was inappropriate because the condominiums were collateral to the
underlying DTPA case. The appeals court distinguished Moss as a case in
which the plaintiff's request for a constructive trust was essentially a prayer
for a judgment lien and not an attempt to acquire an interest in property.352
344. 762 S.W.2d 906 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1988, writ denied).
345. Id. at 907-09.
346. Id. at 907.
347. Id. at 909.
348. Id. It seems that, as a practical matter, the appellant obtained the interlocutory re-
view he sought by forcing the appeals court to decide on the notice's validity.
349. Id. TEx. PROP. CODE ANN. § 12.008 (Vernon 1984) requires, as a condition to can-
celling a notice of lis pendens, that (a) the trial court find that the party who has filed the
notice will be adequately protected by either a deposit with the court of an amount equal to thejudgment sought plus interest and costs or delivery of a guaranty, supported by sureties, in
twice the amount of the judgment sought, and (b) that the deposit or guaranty be delivered.
350. 763 S.W.2d 905 (Tex. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1988, no writ). For convenience the
appellees, Jackson and Dowdy, are collectively called "Jackson".
351. 722 S.W.2d 762 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, no writ). In Moss the plain-
tiffs purchased a house from the defendants in May 1982. In August 1982, the defendants
purchased another home. In 1983, the plaintiffs filed suit against the defendants alleging,
among other things, fraud. In July 1985, the plaintiffs amended their petition alleging the
defendants had purchased their home with the proceeds of their transaction with the plaintiffs
and, therefore, the plaintiffs were an equitable owner of the defendants' new home "to the
extent it was purchased with the proceeds" of the previous sale. The court held the plaintiffs
were not seeking to recover title to, or an interest in, the defendants' new home, except as
security for the recovery of damages that may be awarded to the plaintiffs; thus, the plaintiffs'
request for the imposition of a constructive trust was essentially a prayer for a judgment lien,
and the notice of lis pendens was void. Id. at 763.
352. 763 S.W.2d at 908. Given the similarities between the facts of this case and Moss, the
court's distinction is suspect.
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Since the judgment creditors sought an interest in the condominiums, the
court concluded that the notice of lis pendens had been properly filed and
that TEVE's interest in the condominiums was extinguished at the sheriff's
sale. 353
F Recent Legislation
The 71st Legislature made a number of important changes affecting the
manner in which one can convey real property in Texas. Several of these
changes were merely facilitatory. For instance, an amendment to the Texas
Property Code stipulates that a jurat will now work as well as an acknowl-
edgment in making a document recordable.3 54 An additional amendment
states that a reference to the volume and page number or film code number
of the Real Property Records for a particular county is as acceptable as a
reference to the specific records, such as Deed Records or Deed of Trust
Records, of the county in question, and is therefore sufficient to provide no-
tice of the referenced instrument.355 Finally, an amendment to the Texas
Business Corporation Act provides that the signature of any corporate of-
ficer will be effective to convey a corporation's realty.356
In a step that many will welcome, the lawmakers adopted the Uniform
Federal Lien Registration Act, which Chapter 14 of the Texas Property
Code codifies. 357 The Act's provisions require the IRS to file federal tax lien
notices affecting real property in the real estate records of the county where
the property is located.358 The IRS must file notices affecting personal prop-
erty in the county clerk's office of the county where the property's owner
resides if the owner is an individual, and in the Uniform Commercial Code
records of the Secretary of State if the owner is a partnership or
corporation. 359
The Texas legislature also imposed additional notice requirements on sell-
ers of realty.360 The legislature amended the Texas Local Government Code
to empower municipalities without zoning to require that realty sellers give
purchasers written notice of deed restrictions, including notice of the munic-
ipality's right to enforce the restrictions. 361 The notice, whose form is to be
prescribed by each affected municipality, must be delivered at or before clos-
ing, signed by seller and purchaser, and recorded in the real property
records. 362 Failure to comply will not affect a sale, but may result in liability
to the municipality for a penalty of up to $500.363 Since an executory con-
353. Id. at 909.
354. Tax. PROP. CODE ANN. § 12.001 (Vernon Supp. 1990).
355. Tax. PROP. CODE ANN. § 11.007 (Vernon Supp. 1990).
356. TEx. Bus. CORP. Acr ANN. art. 5.08 (Vernon Supp. 1990). Heretofore, a conveyance
by a Texas corporation was effective only if executed by a president or vice president.
357. TEx. PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 14.001-.007 (Vernon Supp. 1990).
358. Id. at § 14.002(b).
359. Id. at § 14.002(c).
360. TEx. Loc. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 230.005 (Vernon Supp. 1990).
361. Id.
362. Id. at § 230.005(c).
363. Id. at § 230.005(d)(3).
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tract providing for more than six months between signing and closing is con-
sidered a conveyance for purposes of the statute, prudent sellers will want to
give the required notice at the time they deliver the contract. 364
The legislature revised the Texas Water Code to stipulate that a seller
must give the notice required under Section 50.301 before a purchase and
sale agreement is executed.365 Heretofore, that section of the code, which
requires a seller of property located in a municipal utility district, flood con-
trol district, water district, or other special purpose district to give notice to
a buyer identifying the district in which the property is located and specify-
ing the tax rate and authorized bonded indebtedness, allowed the seller to
give notice at or before the closing of the sale.366 The new legislation also
increases somewhat the information required to be given in the notice. 367
Failure to give the notice, which the seller must record in the real property
records of the county in which the property is located, gives the purchaser
the right to terminate the contract.3 68 The provision is inapplicable to con-
veyances by way of foreclosure, deed in lieu of foreclosure, or will or probate
proceedings. 369
IV. CONDOMIN1UMS
A. Disputes Involving Assessments
As illustrated by two Survey cases, Texas courts continue to put teeth into
provisions of the Texas Condominium Act370 that empower condominium
associations. In San Antonio Villa Del Sol Homeowners Ass'n v. Miller371 a
homeowner, disgruntled about a special assessment to defray the cost of re-
placing deteriorating gas lines, refused to pay the special assessment and
then stopped paying his regular monthly assessments. At trial, the court
found that the association had improperly imposed the special assessment
and had acted improperly in cutting off utilities to the owner's unit because
of his non-payment. 372
The appeals court disagreed.373 It found that the special assessment
clearly fell within provisions of the condominium declaration authorizing
special assessments for capital improvements necessary to preserve or main-
tain the integrity of the project's common elements. 374 The court also found
that the association's bylaws expressly permitted the association to take all
actions necessary to abate conditions contrary to the intent and meaning of
364. Id. at § 230.005(g).
365. TEx. WATER CODE ANN. § 50.301 (Vernon Supp. 1990).
366. TEx. WATER CODE ANN. § 50.301 (Vernon 1988).
367. TEx. WATER CODE ANN. § 50.301(b) (Vernon Supp. 1990).
368. Id. at § 50.301(e)(1).
369. Id. at § 50.301(a)(2).
370. TEx. PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 81.001-.210 (Vernon 1984 and Supp. 1990).
371. 761 S.W.2d 460 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1988, no writ).
372. Id. at 461.
373. Id. at 463-65.
374. Id. at 463-64. The court's statement as to reasonableness is interesting: "In fact, the
Association's actions comport in every way with reasonable behavior as set out in prior case
law." Id. at 464.
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the bylaws. 375 Thus, even though the declaration did not specifically author-
ize the association to disconnect utilities, the broad language of the bylaws
supported the association's action. 376 The court noted that each condomin-
ium owner relinquishes some degree of freedom of choice and subordinates
some traditional ownership rights when joining in a condominium regime. 377
In addition, the appellate court noted that the collective association is vested
with considerable discretion in determining what expenses are necessary for
the project's operation and maintenance. 378
In Richard Gill Co. v. Jackson's Landing Owners'Ass'n 379 a condominium
developer was hoist on his own petard, and found liable by virtue of provi-
sions in the condominium declaration that he himself had drafted.380 After
the developer relinquished control of a condominium project to its independ-
ent owners' association, the association brought suit to collect maintenance
assessments which it alleged the developer had failed to pay during the time
he was a condominium owner. The developer asserted that he was not an
owner liable for payment of the assessments pursuant to the terms of the
declaration, that the statute of limitations barred certain of the claims, and
that the claims against him should be offset against monies he had expended.
The appeals court noted that nothing in the declaration excluded the de-
veloper from being a condominium owner or excused him from liability for
the assessments. 381 The court said that the applicable four-year limitations
period would have precluded recovery of certain of the assessments, but held
that the statute of limitations was tolled because the developer had failed in
his duty to keep proper books and records, and that the poor condition of
the books had disabled the association from more quickly discovering the
developer's misdeeds.382 Of special note is the court's express finding that
the developer had a fiduciary relationship with the owners of the individual
condominiums. 38 3 As to the argument that certain expenditures should be
offset against the claimed assessments, the court found the evidence sufficient
to support the trial court's determination that the expenditures were costs of
constructing and marketing the condominium project rather than payments
for maintenance, repair, and replacement under the declaration.384
375. Id. at 464-65.
376. Id. at 465.
377. Id. at 464.
378. Id. (citing Pooser v. Lovett Square Townhome Owners Ass'n 702 S.W.2d 226, 231
(Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Raymond v. Aquarius Condominium
Owners Ass'n, 662 S.W.2d 82, 89 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1983, no writ)).
379. 758 S.W.2d 921 (rex. App.-Corpus Christi 1988, writ denied).
380. Id. at 924-25.
381. Id. at 924. The developer appeared to have drafted the declaration so as to name itself
a condominium owner and to assess itself for its share of maintenance costs. The case does
not, therefore, address the validity of condominium declarations that are drafted to provide
that the developer is not obligated to pay assessments on its own units until such time as the
independent owners' association takes over control of the project, a relatively customary
practice.
382. Id. at 924-25.
383. Id. at 924.




For those developers who forgot to provide for termination in their condo-
minium declarations, the Texas legislature has stepped into the breach to
make certain things are not done amiss. 385 The 1989 Legislature amended
Section 81.110(a) of the Property Code to provide that, even if the declara-
tion makes no provision for terminating the condominium regime, the own-
ers in the regime may do so by a unanimous vote.38 6 If the declaration
provides simply for termination "by agreement of the owners," then a 67%
vote will suffice.38 7 The amended section also makes clear that a declara-
tion's provision for termination by any voting percentage that is higher than
67% will be given effect. 388
C. Books and Records
Burton v. Cravey389 arose out of a trial court's order that the attorney for
an owners' association turn over to a group of dissident owners certain books
and records. The appeals court upheld the trial court's mandamus order,
stating that all condominium owners are entitled to examine the accounts
and supporting vouchers of a condominium regime by reason of provisions
of both the Texas Condominium Act 39° and the Texas Non-Profit Corpora-
tion Act.391 The court held further that the trial court had not abused its
discretion in determining that certain records in the attorney's files were part
of the accounts and supporting records of the condominium association, and
therefore subject to the statutory right of discovery granted to condominium
owners and non-profit corporation members. 392
V. MECHANIC'S AND OTHER LIENS
A. Cases
The contractor defaults, the contractor's surety pays off mechanics and
materialmen, and the surety then seeks to recover amounts due by the owner
to the contractor. This scenario is, of course, commonplace in surety case
law. In the typical instance the courts hold that, even though the surety has
no contractual claim to the monies being held by the owner, the surety is all
the same entitled to recover those monies under the equitable doctrine of
subrogation. What happens, though, when the competing claimant to the
owner's funds is a lender with a duly perfected security interest?
In instances where the surety has satisfied the claims of mechanics and
materialmen who have filed liens complying with Texas lien laws, the surety
wins because the claims of the mechanics and materialmen are legally supe-




389. 759 S.W.2d 160 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, no writ).
390. TEx. PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 81.001-.210 (Vernon 1984 and Supp. 1990).
391. TEx R~v. Ctv. STAT. ANN. art. 1396 (Vernon Supp. 1990); 759 S.W.2d at 161.
392. 759 S.W.2d at 161-62.
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ior to those of the lender. Interfirst Bank Dallas, N.A. v. United States Fi-
delity and Guaranty Co., 393 however, presented a harder case because most
of the mechanics had failed to file liens. Even so, the Dallas court of appeals
aligned itself with the overwhelming weight of authority from other jurisdic-
tions3 94 by holding that the surety's claim trumps the lender's.395 In support
of its decision, the appeals court noted that the traditional right of a surety
to equitable subrogation survived enactment of Article 9 of the Texas Uni-
form Commercial Code 396 and claimed that allowing the equitable claimant
to prevail over the contractual claimant was consistent with equity's goal of
preventing injustice.397 Justice Burnett, in a careful and well-reasoned dis-
sent, distinguished a number of the cases on which the majority relied, chal-
lenged the notion that an injustice had been avoided, and indicated that
because the lender's rights arose prior to those of the surety, the lender
should prevail.398
Gill Savings Association v. International Supply Co., Ina 399 and Occidental
Nebraska Federal Savings Bank v. East End Glass Co. 4 w both highlight the
liberality with which Texas courts view the enforcement of the Texas
mechanics and materialmen's lien statutes. In Gill Savings, the supplier of
plumbing fixtures to an apartment project, being unpaid, brought suit and
obtained judgment for foreclosure of its mechanic's lien. The holder of the
first lien mortgage against the project, who had since acquired the project
through foreclosure, attacked the validity of the supplier's lien. The holder
claimed that the affidavit filed was invalid because it was signed by the attor-
ney for the supplier, claimed an amount far in excess of the actual amount
owed, and included charges for items incurred prior to the appropriate filing
deadlines.
The appeals court held that the attorney's signature was unobjectionable
because the relevant statute does not require that the affidavit be made on
the personal knowledge of the signatory.4° 1 The court noted that the attor-
ney had represented the supplier for many years and said that the attorney
had the means to, and could have become informed about, the necessary
facts.4°2 As to the excess claim (which was approximately $15,000 on a
$75,000 claim), the court determined that the mere fact that the affidavit
claimed more than the amount actually owed was not a disabling deft-
ciency.4°3 Finally, on the question of whether the supplier had timely per-
fected the mechanic's lien, the court relied upon procedural machinations to
393. 774 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1989, writ requested).
394. See cases cited id. at 398-99.
395. 774 S.W.2d at 398-399.
396. Id. at 398 (citing Center v. Schlager, 358 Mass. 789, 267 N.E.2d 492 (1971)).
397. Id. at 397.
398. Id. at 399-406 (Burnett, J. dissenting).
399. 759 S.W.2d 697 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1988, writ denied).
400. 773 S.W.2d 687 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1989,no writ).
401. 759 S.W.2d at 699 (citing TEx. PROP. CODE ANN. § 53.054 (Vernon 1984 and Supp.
1990).
402. Id. at 700.




uphold the supplier's claim-' The court found that the Texas Rules of
Civil Procedure made it incumbent upon the first Hen holder to specifically
deny that the supplier had given the requisite notices for a valid lien.5 5
Since the lien holder failed to do this, the supplier did not need to prove that
it had given all requisite notices for perfection of its lien.406 The court reiter-
ated the well worn rule that "the mechanics and materialman's lien statutes
are to be liberally construed for the purpose of protecting laborers and
materialmen." 4o7
In Occidental Nebraska, which involved the competing claims of a bank
holding a contractual lien and a materialman claiming a statutory lien, the
appeals court held that a materialman had substantially complied with the
statutory notice requirements even though it sent its notice of the unpaid
balance to the contractor rather than the owner. The court said that the
contractor and owner were, as a practical matter, the same people since they
were part of a "scheme of interlocking corporate shells,"'4'0 and that there-
fore the notice served its statutory purpose of giving the owner an opportu-
nity to retain funds still under its control in order to avoid the statutory
lien.409 The appeals court also held that materialman's removal of mirrors
was permissible in light of evidence that no more than three mirrors in 50
were likely to break during the removal. The court said that such odds es-
tablished as a matter of law that the mirrors could be removed without ma-
terial injury either to the pre-existing improvements or to the mirrors
removed. 410
In 2811 Associates, Ltd. v. Metroplex Lighting and Electric411 an electric
supplier brought suit and obtained a default judgment ordering foreclosure
of its mechanic's lien against certain property. The appeals court reversed,
however, finding that the pleadings failed to state a cause of action because
the claim arose under a contract not with the property owner, but rather
with a tenant.412 The court cited the well-settled rule that a mechanic's lien
arising under a contract with a lessee attaches only to the leasehold interest,
not to the fee interest of the lessor.413
The requisites of a bond to indemnify against liens were the subject of
404. Id. at 701.
405. Id.
406. Id. Thx. PROP. CODE ANN. § 53.056(b) (Vernon 1984) (repealed 1990) required cer-
tain notices to be given to a general contractor not later than the 36th day following the 10th
day of the month following each month in which labor was performed and material delivered
and requires similar notice to be given to the owner not later than the 90th day after the 10th
day of the month following the month in which labor was performed or material delivered.
These statutory time periods have been modified by recent legislation. See infra notes 25-29
and accompanying text. The court relied upon Rule 54 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure
in this case. 759 S.W.2d at 701.
407. 759 S.W.2d at 701.
408. 773 S.W.2d at 688 n.2.
409. Id. at 688.
410. Id. at 689.
411. 765 S.W.2d 851 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1989, writ denied).
412. Id. at 852-53.
413. Id. at 853 (citing Diversified Mortgage Investors v. Lloyd D. Blalock Gen. Contrac-
tor, Inc., 576 S.W.2d 794, 805 (Tex. 1978)).
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dispute in Sheldon Pollack Corp. v. Pioneer Concrete of Texas, Ina 414 In
Sheldon an unpaid concrete supplier filed a mechanic's lien affidavit, causing
the general contractor, as principal, to post a bond to indemnify against the
lien.415 The indemnity bond generally complied with the Section 53.172 of
the Texas Property Code, the relevant statute, but contained an additional
clause conditioning the obligations of the principal upon the project owner
timely making all payments under the general construction contract. The
contractor appealed a judgment for the materialman, arguing that since the
owner failed to pay under its contract, the general contractor was released
from liability. The appeals court disagreed, finding that the additional bond
provision went beyond what was specified in the statute and was therefore
unenforceable.416
B. Recent Legislation
The 71st Legislature made extensive modifications to the Texas
mechanic's and materialmen's lien statutes.417 Some of the more salient
changes include the addition of Section 53.021(c) to the Texas Property
Code, extending mechanic's lien protection to an architect, engineer, or sur-
veyor who prepares a plan or plot in connection with proposed construction
or repair of improvements.418 The new statute allows a lien claim only if the
plan or plat is prepared pursuant to a written recordable contract that con-
tains a property description, the contract is recorded, and the plan or plat is
used in performing construction.41 9 New legislation also has revised the
time periods within which lien claims must be asserted and filed.420 The
legislature has also made provision for filing affidavits of commencement of
construction and completion of construction.42 1
414. 765 S.W.2d 843 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1989, writ denied).
415. The bond was intended to be filed in compliance with the provisions of TEx. PROP.
CODE ANN. §§ 53.171 and 53.172 (Vernon 1984). 765 S.W.2d at 845.
416. Id. at 846 (citing TEx. PROP. CODE ANN. § 52.172 (Vernon 1984)). The contractor
also argued that reversal would not harm the materialman, since it could pursue its lien against
the project. The appeals court noted that this was incorrect as the filing of a bond under
§ 53.171 of the Tex. Prop. Code has the effect of cutting off the right of a claimant to foreclose
its lien if it does not bring an action within the 30th day after service of notice of the bond. Id.
(citing TEX. PROP. CODE AN . § 53.171(c) (Vernon 1984)).
417. Act of March 1, 1989, ch. 2, § 13.02, 1989 Tex. Gen. Laws 173 (codified at Tax.
PROP. CODE ANN. § 53.105(a) (Vernon Supp. 1990)); Act of June 14, 1989, ch. 395 § 1, 1989
Tex. Gen. Laws 1527, 1527-28 (codified at Tax. PROP. CODE ANN. § 53.021 (Vernon Supp.
1990)); Act of June 16, 1989, ch. 1138, §§ 1-40, 1989 Tex. Gen. Laws 4693, 4693-707 (codified
at Tax. PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 53.021, 53.025-.026, 53.052-.059, 53.081-.082, 53.085, 53.101,
53.104-.106, 53.124, 53.151-.152, 53.156..159, 53.171-.175, 53.202-.204, 53.206, 53.208,
53.211, 53.233-.234, 53.237 (Vernon Supp. 1990)), Tax. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN., art. 5160
§§ A, B, E, G (Vernon Supp. 1990). Most of the changes are set forth in Chapter 1138 cited
above, which is derived from Senate Bill 1321. The Texas mechanic's and materialmen's lien
statutes are found at Chapter 53 of the Texas Property Code.
418. Tax. PROP. CODE ANN. § 53.021(c) (Vernon Supp. 1990).
419. Id.
420. Id. at § 53.055-.058.




The 71st Legislature enacted the Uniform Vendor and Purchaser Risk
Act422 to allocate the risk of casualty and condemnation where the con-
tracting parties to a real estate purchase agreement have failed to do so. The
new statute provides that if, before the purchaser under a real estate contract
either receives title to or takes possession of the subject property, all or any
part of that property is destroyed or taken by eminent domain through no
fault of the purchaser, then the seller may not enforce the contract, and the
purchaser may recover any portion of the purchase price already paid.423
Conversely, the statute stipulates that if, before the casualty or condemna-
tion occurs, title has passed or the purchaser has taken possession, then the
purchaser's obligations under the contract remain in effect. 424
Several features of the new statute are worth special note. First, the stat-
ute contains no de minimis exception. Presumably, if a $300 tool shed
burned before the closing under a $3-million purchase contract, then the
seller would be free to walk. Second, the statute refers only to property
covered by a contract for the purchase and sale of real property, but does not
indicate whether the destruction of personalty that is also to be conveyed
under such a contract would trigger the seller's avoidance rights. Third, it is
not clear from the statute whether only the purchaser can cancel in the event
of a casualty or condemnation, or whether the seller can do likewise. The
statute's language, stating that if a casualty or condemnation occurs, then
"the vendor may not enforce the contract," 425 suggests that cancellation is
the option only of the purchaser, though the matter is far from clear.
Clearly, contracting parties in substantial transactions will do well to make
express provision for casualty and condemnation rather than relying on the
statute.
Survey cases involving condemnation saw courts decline several invita-
tions to become legislators at large, and instead contain themselves within
tried and true channels of settled jurisprudence. In State v. Rogers426 the
appeals court refused to rule that a condemnee is entitled to any award for
his business's good will or going concern value. Expressly rejecting the new
age views served up by the condemnee,427 the court adhered to the rule first
set forth in Herndon v. Housing Authority of City of Dallas,428 which states
that such compensation is not allowed because good will depends hardly at
all on the location of the business, and a great deal on the capital invested,
economic conditions, and business skills of the owners.429 The Rogers court
declined to make a special exception for the condemnee's auto parts store
despite the condemnee's claim that the business depended vitally on its
422. TEx. PROP. CODE ANN. § 5.007 (Vernon Supp. 1990).
423. TEx. PROP. CODE ANN. § 5.007(b) (Vernon Supp. 1990).
424. Id. at § 5.007(c).
425. Id. at § 5.007(b).
426. 772 S.W.2d 559 (rex. App.-Amarillo 1989, writ denied).
427. Id. at 561.
428. 261 S.W.2d 221 (rex. Civ. App.-Da~las 1953, writ ref'd).
429. 772 S.W.2d at 561.
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"symbiotic relationship" with other neighborhood businesses.430
The Rogers court also refused the state's invitation to change the law so
that the state would be awarded prejudgment interest on the excess amount
that the state had paid into the registry of the court pursuant to Section
21.021(a)(1) of the Texas Property Code.431 Declining to make use of some
adventuresome language in a 1985 wrongful death case decided by the Texas
Supreme Court,432 the court noted that by exercising the option to deposit
money into the registry, the state received the right to immediate possession
of the condemned property even though damage proceedings were still pend-
ing.433 This right, said the court, justified the long-standing rule that the
state may not recover interest on any excess amount so deposited.434
Kilgore Junior College District v. Kettle Restaurants, Inc. 435 affirmed the
settled principle that a condemnee need not seek prejudgment interest in her
pleadings to be entitled to recovery of such interest.43 6 Indeed, the court
noted that the Texas Constitution guarantees the right to compensation for
taken property.437 This entitles the condemnee to damages even if she enters
no pleadings at all after filing an objection to the condemnation
proceedings. 438
Finally, a couple of survey cases dealt with the issue of damages available
to a condenee. First, in Smith v. City of Brenham, Texas43 9 the Fifth Cir-
cuit held that neighbors of land condemned for use as a landfill have no
claim for damages until the condemned land is actually so used.440 Second,
in Eppoleto v. Bournias"1 the appeals court held that property owners have
a right to a jury trial on the issue of expenses incurred and damages suffered
during a temporary possession by a condemning authority. 442
VII. BROKERS
Henry S. Miller Co. v. Ulmer443 involved a broker's right to a commission
for a ten-year lease that allowed the tenant to terminate between the fifth and
sixth years. The broker's agreement with the owner provided that the bro-
ker's commission of four percent of gross rentals would be payable one-half
430. Id.
431. Id. at 563, TEx. PROP. CODE ANN. § 21.021(a)(1) (Vernon 1984).
432. Cavnar v. Quality Control Parking, Inc., 696 S.W.2d 549 (Tex. 1985).
433. 772 S.W.2d at 563.
434. Id. (citing Maddox v. Gulf, Colorado & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 293 S.W.2d 499, 507 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1956, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
435. 768 S.W.2d 775 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1989, writ denied).
436. Id. at 776-77.
437. TEx. CONST. art. I, § 17.
438. 768 S.W.2d at 776 (citing Kennedy v. City of Dallas, 201 S.W.2d 840 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Dalas 1947, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
439. 865 F.2d 662 (5th Cir. 1989).
440. Id. at 663-64 (relying on Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 263 n. 9 (1980), and
distinguishing First English Evangelical Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304
(1987)).
441. 764 S.W.2d 284 (Tex. App.-Waco 1988, no writ).
442. Id. at 285.86.
443. 701 F. Supp. 598 (S.D. Tex. 1988).
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upon the signing of a lease approved by the owner and one-half upon occu-
pancy. When the tenant signed and occupied, the owner refused to pay the
full commission, and contended that the broker should be required to wait
until the tenant's early termination right had expired.
The court, in an appealingly pithy opinion, disagreed.4" It noted that
Texas law is well-settled that an owner owes its broker a commission even if
a brokered lease ultimately yields the owner far less than the owner had
anticipated. 445 The court said that the owner could have insisted on a provi-
sion in the listing agreement that reduced the commission for leases with
early termination rights, or it could have refused to approve the lease.446
Because it did neither, the plain language of the agreement entitled the bro-
ker to its full commission.447
One might call Evans v. Prufrock Restaurants, Inc.44 the case of the lucky
broker. In Evans the broker, acting at the buyer's request, assembled a
transaction whereby a chain of restaurants would change hands, but acted
without ever procuring a written brokerage agreement as required by the
Texas Real Estate License Act.449 Both the buyer and the seller dismissed
the broker after he unsuccessfully attempted to obtain a brokerage agree-
ment from the seller. The transaction took the form of a stock purchase, and
the broker sued the acquired corporation for a finder's fee.
The trial court granted summary judgment to the corporation, holding
that the sale of the restaurant chain was a real estate transaction.45 0 The
appeals court noted that the question of whether a transaction was a sale of
real estate (to which the Texas Real Estate License Act applies) or a sale of
securities (to which it does not) was a question of fact that the trial judge
must submit to a jury.451 Curiously, the appeals court did not remand for
fact-finding on that question, but rather determined that the disputed trans-
action was a sale of securities, and hence not within the ambit of the stat-
ute.452 The appeals court remanded only for a determination of whether the
broker was entitled to a finder's fee.453
VIII. RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS
At issue in Bent Nail Developers, Inc. v. Brooks 454 were restrictive cove-
nants designed to inhibit the purchaser of a tract of land from competing
444. Id. at 599-600.
445. Id. at 599 (citing Fuess v. Mueller, 630 S.W.2d 715, 717 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
[1st Dist.] 1982, no writ).
446. Id. at 599.
447. Id. at 599-600.
448. 757 S.W.2d 804 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1988, writ denied).
449. TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6573a (Vernon Supp. 1990).
450. 757 S.W.2d at 805.
451. Id. at 805 (citing Hall v. Hard, 160 Tex. 565, 335 S.W.2d 584 (1960).
452. Id. at 805-806 (citing, inter alia, Griffith v. Jones, 518 S.W.2d 435, 436 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Tyler, 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.), for the proposition that a sale of stock is personalty, not
real estate).
453. 757 S.W.2d at 806.
454. 758 S.W. 2d 692 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1988, writ denied).
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with the seller, who retained other area tracts. The purchased land was
zoned commercial, which precluded residential development, and was addi-
tionally subject to the seller's restriction, of unlimited duration, that the land
could be developed only for commercial uses. Three years after acquiring
the property, the purchaser, having instituted proceedings seeking the rezon-
ing of the property from commercial to residential, sought a declaratory
judgment cancelling the deed restrictions. On appeal from a summary judg-
ment in favor of the seller, the appeals court noted that the restrictions were
defective because they contained no time limitation.45 The court stated that
this defect is not fatal and that a court of equity will reform such covenants
to restrain the purchaser from competing for a time that is reasonable under
the circumstances. 456 The court remanded because the issue of what consti-
tutes a reasonable duration for a covenant is one of fact.457
If the Bent Nail trial court feels bashful about reforming the covenant at
issue, it can take heart, not only in the directive of the appeals court, but also
in a 1989 amendment to Chapter 15 of the Texas Business & Commerce
Code.458 The amendment authorizes courts to reform covenants not to com-
pete by placing reasonable limits on a covenant's duration, geographical
area, and the scope of activity restrained.45 9 The statute requires that, to be
enforceable, the covenant must be ancillary to an otherwise enforceable
agreement and must be either signed on the same date as that ancillary
agreement or supported by independent valuable consideration. 460
Baldwin v. Barbon Corp.461 illustrates that, when it comes to restrictive
covenants, the developer giveth and the developer taketh away. The restric-
tive covenants at issue in Baldwin originally covered a 534-acre tract and
reserved to the developer the right to amend or alter the restrictions. Seven-
teen years after filing the covenants, and after having subdivided 59 acres of
the tract into residential lots, the developer sought to exclude the remaining
475 acres from the coverage of the restrictions. One of the lot owners chal-
lenged the exclusion, claiming among other things that the power to amend
or alter cannot comprehend the power to delete or remove. The appeals
court upheld the trial court's decision in favor of the developer.462 The ap-
peals court cited Couch v. Southern Methodist University"s3 as authority for
the proposition that an amendment that destroys the restrictions is permissi-
ble, so long as the restrictions empower the amending party to promulgate
amendments. 46
455. Id. at 693.
456. Id. (citing Weatherford Oil Tool Co. v. Campbell, 161 Tex. 310, 313-14, 340 S.W. 2d
950, 952 (1960)).
457. 758 S.W.2d at 694.
458. Tnx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 15.50(2) (Vernon Supp. 1990).
459. Id.
460. Id. at § 15.50(1).
461. 773 S.W.2d 681 (Tex. App.--San Antonio, 1989, writ denied).
462. Id. at 686.
463. 10 S.W.2d 973, 974 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1928, judgm't adopted).
464. 773 S.W.2d at 685-86.
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In Candlelight Hills Civic Ass'n. v. Goodwin465 the homeowners' associa-
tion had sought to acquire a recreational facility for the use of its members.
A homeowner challenged the association, contending that the association
had no power to use the association's funds for that purpose. The trial court
agreed with the dissenting homeowner, but the appeals court reversed. 466 It
noted that the restrictions broadly empowered the association's trustees to
expend funds to accomplish anything they regarded as necessary or desirable
to maintaining good order in the subdivision and considered by them to be
for the general benefit of the homeowners. 467
The appeals court also pointed to a provision in the association's organiza-
tional documents which defined the association's purpose as, among other
things, promoting recreational activities within the subdivision and taking
concerted action for the homeowners' welfare. 46 Of overriding importance,
in the court's view, was the 1987 amendment to the Texas Property Code
that requires courts to construe restrictive covenants liberally to give effect
to their purposes and intent.469 The appeals court noted that its decision
hardly gave the association untrammelled discretion to spend at will; rather,
the covenants at issue contained a host of limitations and restraints on the
association's activities, including a requirement that a majority of the home-
owners consent to the purchase.470
Two other Survey cases, Guajardo v. Neece471 and Gettysburg Homeown-
ers Ass'n, Inc. v. Olson,472 illustrate the spacious discretion that is allowed
the trial judge in deciding whether to grant injunctive relief in cases brought
to enforce restrictive covenants.473 In Guajardo the appeals court affirmed
the trial court's temporary injunction prohibiting the appellant from con-
struction a dog kennel, which had been challenged as a "noxious or offensive
trade or activity" that might become "an annoyance or nuisance to the
neighborhood," thereby contravening the covenants in question. 474 In Get-
tysburg the appeals court affirmed the trial court's refusal to grant an injunc-
tion sought by a subdivision's architectural control committee to prevent a
home builder from proceeding with construction of homes whose designs the
committee had not approved.475 In both instances, the appeals courts noted
that an appellate court can review the grant or denial of a temporary injunc-
465. 763 S.W.2d 474 (rex. App.-Houston (14th Dist.] 1988, writ denied).
466. Id. at 482.
467. Id. at 478.
468. Id. at 478-79.
469. Id. at 477; Tax. PROP. CODE ANN. § 202.003(a) (Vernon Supp. 1990).
470. 763 S.W.2d at 480-81.
471. 758 S.W.2d 696 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1988, no writ).
472. 768 S.W.2d 369 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1989, no writ).
473. 758 S.W.2d at 690; 768 S.W.2d at 370-71.
474. 758 S.W.2d at 697. In what may be something of a setback for dog lovers, the court
rejected the contention that Texas public policy in favor of caring for domesticated animals
militated in favor of permitting construction and operation of the proposed kennel. Id. at 699.
The court noted that the public policy, as explicated in Georg v. Animal Defense League, 231
S.W.2d 807, 811 (rex. Civ. App.--San Antonio 1950, writ ref'd n.r.e.), contemplates institu-
tions which contribute to the welfare only of "unattached and stray" (might a New Age court
say "homeless"?) animals. Id.
475. 768 S.W.2d at 370.
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tion only if the trial judge has clearly abused his discretion. 476
IX. EASEMENT AND ROADS
Lamar County Electric Cooperative Ass'n v. Bryant477 involves some root
and branch principles of correlative easement rights. A landowner and an
electric cooperative stipulated at trial that the cooperative had an easement
by prescription along one side of the landowner's property. When trees
within the easement began to interfere with the cooperative's electrical lines,
the cooperative cut down the trees, prompting the landowner's successful
suit for the value of the trees and for punitive damages. The appeals court
noted that while every easement carries with it the right to do whatever is
necessary for its full enjoyment, an easement holder may not unreasonably
interfere with the rights of the servient estate.478 The court found sufficient
evidence to support the jury's determination that the cooperative could sim-
ply have trimmed the trees to secure the enjoyment of its easement, and that
cutting down the trees without consulting the landowner was sufficient to
justify a $7,500 punitive damage award.479
The City of Galveston's desire to secure a federal grant for roadway con-
struction gave rise to Farmer's Marine Copperworks, Inc v. City of Galves-
ton.480 In Farmer's Marine a warehouse owner had, for some 25 years,
maintained two craneways which extended into a city street and railroad
right-of-way. The craneways originally had been built to unload railroad
cars, but after the railway tracks were removed, the owner used the
craneways to unload trucks. In resisting the city's demand that he remove
the structures, the owner argued that the railroad had consented to the en-
croachment and that the city was estopped from removing the structures
because they were erected pursuant to a contract whereby the city had
agreed to abandon a public alley and in reliance thereon the owner expanded
its warehouse.
The court of appeals, in upholding the trial court's order that the owner
remove structures, noted that because the street was a public street, the rail-
road held only a right-of-way or easement in gross.481 The court noted that
easements in gross are generally personal to the grantee and are not assigna-
ble unless the easement contains an express assignment provision.48 2 The
railroad's easement from the city, however, expressly prohibited any assign-
ment without the city's consent, and therefore any permission granted by the
railroad went beyond its powers. 4 3 Finally, the court noted that the doc-
476. Id. at 371; 758 S.W.2d at 699.
477. 770 S.W.2d 921 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1989, no writ).
478. Id. at 923 (citing Simpson v. Phillips Pipe Line Co., 603 S.W.2d 307 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Beaumont 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Stout v. Christian, 593 S.W.2d 146 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Austin 1980, no writ)).
479. 770 S.W.2d at 923-24.
480. 757 S.W.2d 148 (Tex. App.-Houston [Ist Dist.] 1988, no writ).
481. Id. at 151.
482. Id. (citing Williams v. Humble Pipe Line Co., 417 S.W.2d 453 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Houston 1967, no writ)).
483. 757 S.W.2d at 151-52.
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trine of estoppel does not apply against a unit of government in the exercise
of its governmental functions unless justice, honesty, or fair dealing requires
such applicability. 484 Although the city had approved the construction
plans and the craneways had existed for twenty-five years, the court none-




Fish v. Bannister48 6 reiterated a few basic principles of adverse possession.
First, a party may adversely possess land even if he is unaware that he does
not have record title to the land.4 87 Second, the mere execution of leases and
easements by the record owner does not interrupt the exclusive nature of an
adverse claimant's possession unless actions by the tenant or easement
holder are sufficient to notify the adverse claimant that he has been
ousted.488 And third, an adverse claimant who supports his claim by activi-
ties in addition to grazing need not designedly enclose the claimed land.489
Bustamante v. Flores49° is an instance where an adverse possession claim
under the ten-year statute4 91 failed because it was not commenced under a
claim of right inconsistent with and hostile to the prior owner's claim. 492
Bustamante arose out of a 1962 oral installment contract for deed. All of the
purchaser's modest improvements to the lot were made before she stopped
paying the required installments in 1964. When the heirs of the seller fenced
the lot in 1985, the purchaser removed the fence, prompting a suit by the
heirs in trespass to try title. The appeals court affirmed the trial court's
rejection of the purchaser's claim under the ten-year statute.4 93 The court
agreed that no adverse possession claim was ever properly commenced be-
cause the purchaser's entry on the lot was with permission pursuant to an
oral contract.494 Moreover, even had a claim been commenced, the claim
would not have properly been continued because a 1964 payment of a
purchase installment evidenced that the purchaser recognized the title of the
seller.495
484. Id. at 152 (citing City of Hutchins v. Prasifka, 450 S.W.2d 829 (rex. 1970); City of
Houston v. Lyons Realty, Ltd., 710 S.W.2d 625 (rex. App.-Houston [ist Dist.] 1986, no
writ)).
485. 757 S.W.2d at 152.
486. 759 S.W.2d 714 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1988, no writ).
487. Id. at 718.
488. Id. at 717 (citing Sterling v. Tarvin, 456 S.W.2d 529 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth
1970, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
489. Id. at 720. In Fish, the other activities included, inter alia, maintenance of an existing
fence, construction of a new fence, construction of pipelines, receipt of payments for surface
damage, and hunting.
490. 770 S.W.2d 934 (rex. App.-San Antonio 1989, no writ).
491. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 16.026(b) (Vernon 1986).
492. 770 S.W.2d 936-38.
493. Id. at 938.
494. Id.
495. Id. at 936, 938.
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In Jones v. Harrison 496 the appeals court affirmed that where a judgment
creditor seeks to foreclose his judgment lien during the ten-year period al-
lowed by Section 52.006 of the Texas Property Code,497 but after purchasers
from the judgment creditor have adversely possessed the property pursuant
to the three and five-year adverse possession statutes,498 the foreclosure is
invalid because the lien has been extinguished.499 In addition, the 71st Leg-
islature amended the ten-year adverse possession statute to make clear that
an adverse possession claimant can establish the boundaries of his claim by
registered deed as well as by some other registered memorandum of title.5°°
XI. HOMESTEAD
Matter of Moody501 is yet another illustration of the principle that even
the most unseemly activities of a homestead claimant will not jeopardize his
homestead exemption. From 1964 through 1983, Moody engaged in several
transactions by which he fraudulently conveyed portions of a 575-acre tract.
The transactions included the following: (a) in 1977, Moody conveyed the
tract to a wholly-owned corporation; (b) in early 1979, Moody designated
200 acres of the tract as his homestead; (c) later that year, he designated a
100-acre portion of the tract as his homestead, stating that the designation
was to be effective if the former designation were found ineffective; (d) in
1980, Moody conveyed to a third party an undivided one-half interest in 10
acres out of the 100-acre portion, and a life estate in the remaining one-half
interest of the 10-acres; (e) in 1982, although the 575-acre tract was still
owned by Moody's corporation, Moody again conveyed that tract to his cor-
poration, excluding only the 100 acres designated as homestead in 1979; (f)
in early 1983, the corporation conveyed 200 acres of the tract to Moody
(including most of the property described in his 1979 200-acre homestead
designation); and (g) several weeks later, Moody designated that same 200-
acre tract as his homestead and conveyed the tract to himself as trustee.
In the ensuing bankruptcy proceedings, it was undisputed that the convey-
ances were fraudulent, and the creditors sought to prove that Moody had
either alienated or abandoned his homestead.50 2 They first contended that
the 1977 and 1982 conveyances to the corporation were valid transfers
which constituted alienations of the property. The Fifth Circuit, however,
found that no consideration was given for the transfers, and that Moody had
496. 773 S.W.2d 759 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1989, writ denied).
497. TEx. PROP. CODE ANN. § 52.006 (Vernon 1984).
498. Tax. Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.024-.025 (Vernon 1986).
499. 773 S.W.2d at 760, (citing Shaw v. Ball, 23 S.W.2d 291 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1930,
judgm't adopted)).
500. TEx. Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.026(c) (Vernon Supp. 1990). Heretofore,
this subsection provided that the boundaries of an adverse possessor's claim extended to the
boundaries specified in a "registered memorandum of title other than a deed." TEx. Civ.
PRAc. & REM. CODE § 16.026(c) (Vernon 1986).
501. 862 F.2d 1194 (5th Cir. 1989).
502. Under Texas law, homestead rights may be lost only through death, abandonment, or
alienation. 862 F.2d at 1198.
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neither intended to nor succeeded in alienating his property.503
The creditors next argued that Moody's various conveyances and his long
absences amounted to an abandonment of the homestead. The Fifth Circuit
held, however, that Moody never intended to pass title to the property, but
intended only to shield the homestead from his creditors; therefore, the
transfers were void, and a void transfer cannot constitute an abandonment of
homestead rights.504 Further, the court said that Moody's absences did not
constitute abandonment because no evidence existed that he acquired an-
other homestead or that he never intended to return.505
The creditors next claimed that Moody was entitled only to a 100-acre
exemption. Moody argued that the constitutional provision stating a rural
homestead "shall consist of not more than two hundred acres of land...,,os
was inconsistent with, and controlled over, the Texas Property Code provi-
sion which limits the rural homestead exemption for a single, adult person to
100 acres.5 07 The Fifth Circuit stated that the statutory and constitutional
provisions were not inconsistent.508 The Texas Constitution decrees that a
homestead may not be larger than 200 acres, but does not prohibit the Texas
legislature from establishing smaller limits.509
503. Id. at 1198-99.
504. Id. at 1199 (citing Hughes v. Parmer, 164 S.W.2d 576, 577 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin
1942, no writ)).
505. 862 F.2d at 1199.
506. Id. at 1200. (see TEx. CONST. art. XVI, § 51 1845, amended 1983)).
507. Tax. PROP. CODE ANN. § 41.002(b)(2) (Vernon Supp. 1990).
508. 862 F.2d at 1201.
509. Id.
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